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Preface 
This book is designed as a brief introduction to the understanding of 
decision making in work settings. It is designed for use in graduate 
courses and should be supported by a wide range of additional reading 
materials and practical exercises. The approach is multi-disciplinary and 
pluralistic: there are many perspectives from which decision making may 
be viewed. Similarly, there are many differences in decision making 
between individuals and between contexts. 
The book is intended to contribute to a raised awareness of the many 
issues and high complexity attaching to important decisions. It may or 
may not help the reader to become a better decision maker. That outcome 
depends on personal desire and availability of resources, including time 
and pressure, as much as anything else. However it is hoped that those 
readers who are accustomed to the traditional focus on 'rational' decision 
making will quickly learn that decision making is a complex and many-
faceted activity. 
• • • 
The text is divided into six modules or parts, each looking at a specific 
aspect of decision making in organisations. Module 1 looks at some 
important philosophical issues, and introduces the 'convential' theories 
based in economics and sociology. Theoretical and empirical 
explanations of the decision process are examined in Module 2. Module 3 
explores some of the aids to decision making. The individual as decision 
maker is the subject of Module 4, andModule 5 examines group decision 
making behaviours. Module 6 is a review, and suggests some of the 
implications and consequences of a course of study into decision making. 
This book is based on my teaching of the Approaches to Decision Making 
[initially Managerial Decision :tvlaking] course on the MBA programme at 
Edith Cowan University [formerly \Vestern Australian College of 
Advanced Education]. This course is, and always has been, highly 
interactive and I am indebted to the many students ·1Nho have participated 
for many improvements in the content and overall approach. 
I also acknowledge the support of the Division of Resources Design and 
Development and the School of Manacement at Edith Cowan for their 
assistance in develoing this book. 
Richard J McKenna 
June 1996 
Module 1: What it is about 
Chapter 1 Setting the 
about for Learning 
Aims of this chapter: 
Framework 
Decisions 
• to arouse your interest in the study of decision making; 
• to begin the process of breaking down your assumptions and 
predjuces; 
• to introduce the concept of 'ignorance' as a way of understanding 
'knowledge'; 
• to make you conciously aware of different meanings of 'rational'. 
Managerial decision making is complex, many-faceted, uncertain and risky. 
Often, individual managers must make, and take full responsibility for, decisions. 
But it is also likely that a decision will involve participation by a group - large or 
small. 
The Manager's Roles 
Decision making is a major aspect of every manager's work. This is best 
illustrated in Mintzberg's [1973, 1975] framework [Figure 1.1]. Because of the 
authority and status attached to a manager's position in the organisation there are 
ten roles to be performed. These are grouped into interpersonal, informational 
and decision making. Mintzberg also described a manager's work as 
• having a fragmented nature; 
• being action oriented; 
• having a preference for live, up-to-date information; 
• being performed at a frantic pace. 
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All of these characteristics and the interpersonal and informational roles have an 
impact on the manager's decision making. 
Figure 1.1 
The Nature of Managerial Work 
[Adapted from Mintzberg, 1973, Figure 8 and p 28-53] 
ROLES 
WORK 
FRAGMENTED 
ACTION PREFERENCE 
UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION 
FRANTIC PACE 
Dating from Allison [1969] many conceptual models have been developed to 
enable description and analysis of decisions. You have the opportunity to study 
several of these during this course. Mason & Mitroff [1981] used the evocative 
terms 'tame' and 'wicked'- see Lyles and Thomas [1988]; and McCall & Kaplan 
[1990] used 'prepackaged' and 'ill-defined' to describe the extremes of the 
continuum of decision types [Figure 1.2]. 
McCall & Kaplan [1990] reported that there was a fairly even distribution of 
problems along the continuum from prepackaged to ill-defined [or from well 
structured through partially structured to unstructured]. This distribution is 
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Figure 1.2. 
Characteristics of Decision Types 
TAME-... .. WICKED 
CHARACTERISTIC Well- Partially 
·Unstructured 
structured structured 
FREQUENCY Many Few to many One-off 
TIME SPAN Short Short, medium Long 
or long 
DECISION Specified in Partly specified Cannot be 
PROCEDURES advance specified 
INFORMATION Complete and Partial, with Incomplete, 
accurate known accuracy unknown accuracy 
MANAGERIAL Little, if any Final decision Resolved using 
INVOLVEMENT using results experience, 
IN RESOLUTION from structured beliefs and 
portion judgement 
BELIEFS ABOUT Certain Certainty Uncertain 
CAUSE/EFFECT regarding 
RELATIONSHIPS some aspects 
PREFERENCES Certain May be certain Uncertain 
REGARDING 
POSSIBLE 
OUTCOMES 
OUTCOME Repeated Two managers Managers may 
resolutions may agree on reach different 
produce the relevant data conclusions 
same result but reach 
different 
conclusion 
% of total : 22.4 18.2 22.9 15.4 21.1 
( McCall & Kaplan, 1990, p13) 
shown by the percentages at the bottom of Figure 1.2. In this course, our focus is 
on the problems near the 'wicked' end of the continuum. The 'tame' problems 
can be routinized so as to have little analytical interest. A qualification of course 
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is that at some time in the past these routinized problems were probably new and, 
therefore, wicked. 
Another way to appraise the context of problems is according to the number of 
people involved in decision making and the number affected [Figure 1.3]. 
Harrison [1995: 12-17] notes that while all individuals make decisions that affect a 
limited number of individuals and small groups, a few make decisions which 
have a very wide ranging impact. 
Impact of 
Decisions 
Many people, 
Major effect 
Few people, 
Minor effect 
Figure 1.3 
A Hierarchy of Decision Making 
[Based on Harrison, 1987, p 11-16] 
WORLD 
COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZATION 
GROUP 
INDIVIDUAL 
All people .... 11111---------•.-.... Few people 
Number of decision makers 
A diversion to the world of ignorance, paradigms 
and rationality 
Most of us are usually fairly certain of our ideas and opinions on most subjects, 
including those about which we make decisions. This confidence is often 
misplaced [McCall & l<i;lplan, 1990; Kerwin, 1993]. In fact, in addition to the things 
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we know and those we are aware we don't know, we also 'forget' what we have 
learnt, dont know what we are ignorant about, hold 'false truths', and are 
ignorant about other things because we don't want to know, or have been told we 
should not know. These areas of knowledge and ignorance can be mapped 
[Kerwin, 1993, 1994]. [Figure 1.4] 
known 
unknowns 
Figure 1.4 
Learning from Ignorance 
[Kerwin, 1994] 
unknown 
unknowns 
----~ 
tacit 
knowing 
taboos 
denials 
known 
knowns 
errors, 
false 'truths' 
Given opportunity and desire we can learn about the things we know we don't 
know, and in doing so we may become aware that there are other matters of 
which we did not know - our unknown unknowns. Knowing about them 
makes it possible for us to start learning about them. Also, we often have 
knowledge of things but are not consciously aware of this knowledge - tacit 
knowledge. By exploring our unknowns and our known knowns we can 
discover these things we have forgotten we know, or when needed, they may leap 
into our consciousness. 
Also, there are things we think we know - erroneously. We are wrong! In fact, 
through time, whole bodies of "knowledge" can be proven wrong. In medical 
science it has been found that 50% of "knowledge" is proven wrong within ten 
years. Unlearning erroneous knowledge is as important as developing 
knowledge from our unknowns. 
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Finally there are matters which we are not permitted to know, or do not wish to 
know - the taboos which are outside the ruling paradigm, and our denials or 
knowledge that is too painful to face. 
Thinking about the things we believe we know, and exploring the limits of our 
knowledge help us to become aware of the assumptions and principles 
underlying the decisions that we make. This exploration requires a variety of 
learning methods: discussion, observation, experimentation, finding and reading 
appropriate books, viewing pictures and films, listening to sound recordings, 
attending formal courses, etc. 
ACTIVITY: THINKING 
Think about one or more of the following statements. 
What do you know about it? What don't you know? 
Map the unravelling of your ignorance, and your knowledge. 
a] Meeting our needs without jeopardizing the prospects of future 
generations to meet their needs? 
b] The effects of the computer on the kinds of knowledge, forms of 
communication, and ways of knowing experienced by managers? 
c] Measuring the success of work organisations? 
Paradigms 
Most of us are aware of the concept of paradigms made popular by Burrell & 
Morgan [1979 /1988] and Kuhn [1970]. The Burrell and Morgan framework is 
useful in that it helps us appreciate the approaches different people take to 
organisational life. They classified belief systems along two vectors: 
• regulation to radical change; 
• subjective to objective. 
Taken' together these provide four archetypes: interpretivist, functional, radical 
humanist and radical structuralist. [Figure 1.5] Functionalism dominates 
organisational theory and research. However, during the 1980s interest in the 
importance of cognition has brought concepts from psychology into organisation 
· analysis_ with a cosequent emergence of the interpretivism paradigm. 
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The Burrell & Morgan matrix is just one of many ways of classifying approaches 
to understanding organisations. Another is through the paradigms used by 
various communities of scholars [disciplines] such as economics, sociology, 
psychology, anthropology. Each has assumptions about what is important for the 
understanding of the behaviour of individuals and organisations. These 
assumptions define what is legitimate in terms of knowledge and techniques of 
analysis. Thus, analysts from each can view particular situations and come to 
quite different interpretations, conclusions and recommendations. Sometimes 
they may even agree on conclusions 
Figure 1.5 
Four paradigms of organisational analysis 
[Burrell & Morgan, 1979 /1988] 
Assumptions about 
the nature of society 
Radical change 
Radical Radical 
Humanism Structuralism 
Interpretivism Functionalism 
Regulation 
Subjective, ·unlllll""'"""'""""""'"'""""""""'"""""lllllllu·· Objective 
Assumptions about the 
nature of social science 
and recommendations, but for very different reasons. In coming weeks we will 
compare some of these paradigms. 
The vectors used to classify paradigms are continuums rather than absolutes: 
there are grey areas of transition from one to another. Each paradigm provides 
one perspective, and a pluralistic, multi-disciplinary approach is necessary for 
understanding the decision process- the why and how of any particular decision. 
You can not declare a particular paradigm view correct and another incorrect in 
any absolute sense. A view becomes dominant because of the compelling nature 
of the advocate's argument [Gioia & Pitrie, 1990], and because it is accepted as a 
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----------------·----------
part of the deep cultural patterns of thought and behaviour of a community. 
[Bowers, 1995] 
Rational behaviour 
The way in which we understand the world around us affects the approaches we 
take to decision making. One important aspect of this understanding is how we 
define rational behaviour. There are three valid definitions of rationality [Stacey, 
1993, p 22-3]. 
Reality-testing Rationality involves testing for reality, where that reality might 
be of an emotional, ideological or cultural kind. Rational means sensible, 
reasonable in the circumstances, sane, not foolish, absurd or extreme. 
Rationality Rationality is behaving and deciding only on the basis of 
propositions that can be consciously,reasoned about, rather than on the basis of 
customs, norms, beliefs. Rational means rejecting that which can not be 
proven or tested by reason applied to objective facts. 
Technical rationality Rationality is behaviour that is preceded by fixing 
objectives and weighing up options based on observable facts. Rationality is a 
method of deciding that involves setting clear objectives, gathering facts, 
generating options, and choosing one that maximises or satisfices the 
objective. 
Of these three meanings of rational 
• the second and third reject the first as being irrational; 
• the first suggests the others should be avoided. 
All three meanings are acceptable, and enable conflicting explanations of how 
managers seek objectives through strategic decision making. 
Definition 
So far, I have not attempted a definition of decision or decision making. This is 
because it is important that you approach the concept with an open mind. "It is 
important not to start out by assuming that which we wish to explain." [Chia, 
1994: 801] Observer-language such as 'decision making' infuse and become part of 
the intellectual 'baggage' of academic discourse. In writing about and discussing 
concepts such as 'decision' we impose our own subjective paradigm view of the 
reality under discussion. In opening up your paradigm view, I should not 
attempt to replace your prejudices and bias with my own. 
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It is convenient to explain life, including organisational lite, in terms of intention 
or goal, choice, and significant events. But, underlying these are a myriad of 
contending subprocesses present in every cognitive act which make present a 
version of reality. [Chia, 1994: 802] A decision is not a black and white event. 
Rather it is an interactive series of gloriously coloured microcosmic operations 
and 'being there' which bring forth and insistently make present a version of 
reality. [Chia, 1994; Langley, et al, 1995] Some useful definitions are: 
"[D]ecisions- even those that on the surface seem straightforward, such as 
the design of a cargo latch- are not simple, discrete events. 
Decisions are streams of choices.' [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 3] 
"[D]ecisions are active operations which bring forth and hence privilige 
discrete 'events' and 'entities' at the expense of movement, action and 
becoming. Such events and entities thereby appear to be unproblematically 
discrete, independent, identifiable [e.g. a decisional 'event'] and hence readily 
amenable to systematic analysis." [Chia, 1994: 800] 
"[D]ecision-making is best understood as a process of reality creation through 
organization members' representations of their own role and activity.' 
[Laroche,1995:72] 
"[D]ecision, like so many other concepts in organization theory, is sometimes 
an artificial construct, a psychological one that imputes commitment to 
action. For individuals as well as for organizations, commitment need not 
precede action, or, perhaps more commonly, whatever commitment does 
precede action can be vague and confusing.' [Langley, et al, 1995: 266] 
Decision Debacles 
Because of the inherent nature of decisions it is difficult to analyse 'good 
decisions' -the beliefs, operations and beingness that bring forth successful 
actions and commitments. As Nutt [1989: 13] observes, bad decisions point out 
the need for better understanding, and better processes in decision making. Thus, 
a good starting point is to review and analyse some classic bad decisions. 
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Chapter2 Perspectives on 
Decisions 
Aims of this chapter: 
• to introduce different models of Man; 
• to introduce theories of the firm; 
• to raise your awareness of a range of economic theories; 
• to intoduce the sociological approach to understanding 
organisations; 
• to make readers aware of the embeddedness of theories. 
Whatever the nature of decisions, and however problematic the definition, there 
is value both in understanding how decisions are made and in developing 
theories and models to assist decision makers. At least, it is desirable to contribute 
to a reduction in the number and seriousness of decision debacles. As noted 
above, each of us approaches the decision field from our own individual 
perspective, carrying the baggage of our own paradigms. It is useful to appreciate 
the nature of some of the broad paradigm and discipline categories which can 
legitimately be applied in describing and analsing decisions, and in explaining and 
predicting decision making behaviour. 
"What each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not only of 
the evidence about what.happened but also of the "conceptual lenses" 
through which he looks at the evidence." [Allison, 1969: 689] 
Models of Man 
A useful starting point is consideration of possible conceptions of persons, or 
'models of Man'. There are five generic models which have relevance to the 
study of organisations and decision making. The models and their basic 
assumptions are: 
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Rational Economic Man 
Atomistic economic agents, both individual persons and firms, 
pursue their own self-interes. Consumers seek to maximize utility. 
Firms seek to maximize profit, and in doing so they 
• choose a least cost combination of inputs for each level of output, 
• choose that level of output that maximizes profit, 
• have perfect knowledge and information, 
• behave atomistically -that is, decision makers within the firm act 
as one in pursuit of a common goal. . 
Bureaucratic Man 
It is recognised that organisational decisions are made by people, and 
that people are not a homogeneous goal-oriented species. However, 
individuals are malleable and can be influenced by the structure and 
design of the organisation. Each manager is a specialist, and can be 
allowed to exercise discretion according to delegated authority. 
Decision makers may be individuals, but their decisions are 
governed by the office or position held. A powerful organisational 
internal decision structure governs all decision making. 
Social Man 
In organisations, individuals come together as a group subject to 
informal guidelines and rules for behaviour. Decision makers 
belong to groups and are guided by the group's purposes and 
guidelines. Decision making is governed by the needs of groups 
within the organisation. 
Behavioural Man 
There are several models which stress the importance of the 'inner' 
or psychological factors of the person. These will be reviewed in 
Module 4. A well known example is Maslow's hierarchy of needs 
model which states that individual needs form a five-level 
hierarchy: physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem, and self 
actualisation. Decision making will be shaped according to the 
dominant level of need. 
12 
Political Man 
Within organisations, and other social systems, decision makers 
have 
• a base of power through the control of resources, technical skills, 
or a body of knowledge, 
• the willingness to use this power to optimise their own position, 
• political skill. 
Political action takes place when an actor [decision maker] 
• recognises that the achievement of its goal is influenced by other 
actors in the situation, 
• undertakes manipulative action against some or all of the others. 
Theories of the Firm 
Theories of the firm provide a perspective for thinking about organisational 
objectives and a framework for analysing important research problems. [Seth & 
Thomas, 1994: 166] There are a number of such theories- each set in its own 
paradigm, and with a particular model of Man. Most fit into the functional cell of 
the Burrell and Morgan matrix. Many also present organisational life in terms of 
intention, choice, and significant events. [Chia, 1994, see above.] 
Allison [1969: 689-690] argued that 
• analysts think about [organisational] problems in terms of largely conceptual 
models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought; 
• most analysts explain [and predict] in terms of the rational economic model; 
• two 'alternative' conceptual models- organisational process model and 
bureaucratic politics model- provide a base for improved explanation and 
prediction. 
All of Allison's models as well as the models reviewed by Seth & Thomas would 
fit into the Burrell & Morgan functionalst paradigm discussed above. 
Seth & Thomas [1994] reviewed several economic theories of the firm from the 
viewpoint of strategy researchers. The most relevant assumptions of their 
comparison of seven theories are summarised in Figure 2.2. The theories are also 
classified on two methodological vectors: inductive-deductive and normative-
positive. [Figure 2.1] 
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The induction process starts with accepted observational statements about specific 
events and infers a generalisation. The deductive mode starts with a set of 
assumptions to prove a theorem by some standard set of rules of inference. 
Normative theory is prescriptive- the establishing of a standard of what ought to 
be done. Positivism recognises only positive facts and observable phenomena -
its aim is to describe what is, rather than what should be done. Values are 
excluded. This is the traditional approach of the physical sciences, and the 
claimed approach of neoclassical economics. Economics, however, is based on a 
fundamental value assumption- that every individual acts to maximize 
monetary gain. 
Together, the orientation and process vectors describe four categories of research 
approaches. You should internalise this fact now. In doing so, you must not 
confuse analytical methodology with what is being observed. 
• inductive/ deductive and normative/positive provide 
frameworks for observation and theorising. They are not 
necessarily the categories of real decision behaviour. An actual 
decision may be, for example, inductive and normative, or it may 
be a mixture of all four, or even not any. It can be observed from 
any of the four methodological categories. 
Positive 
Theory 
orientation 
Normative 
Figure 2.1 
The methodology of theories of the firm. 
Behavioral economics Neoclassical microeconomics 
Managerial economics New IO economics 
Transactions cost economics 
Agency 
theory 
Traditional IO economics 
Inductive Process 
Deductive 
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Economic theories 
Economic theory emerged as a discipline during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Economics became the science of 'interests' with 'passions' excluded 
and left to the arts and yet to form social sciences. Neoclassical microeconomics 
was well developed when large industrial organisations began to emerge early in 
the twentieth century and had a strong influence on the methodology applied in 
the study of these organisations. Because its assumptions are somewhat 
unrealistic in the socio-politico-economic systems in which organisations 
function, neoclassical microeconomics has not always provided satisfactory 
explanation and basis for policy. Alternative models have been developed. 
Both neoclassical theory and industrial organisation theories are based on the 
profit maximisation assumption, and assume that decision makers have perfect 
information [including certainty, instant availability of data, and forecasts of the 
future]. The following summaries rely heavily on Seth & Thomas [1994] 
The neoclassical theory of the firm 
The concept of rational economic man is central to neoclassical theory. The firm 
is represented by a production function subject to increasing [and then decreasing] 
returns to scale. The average cost curve is U shaped and intersects a price curve to 
define the optimum production level. The firm is an atomistic agent and its 
managers act uniformly [make decisions]in the interests of the owners. 
Traditional 10 economics 
Observation that microeconomic theory did not always explain market behaviour 
led to development of industrial organisation [IO] economics. This was a 
normative approach to explain differences in performance [profits] between 
industries. The theory uses industry structure to explain performance through 
conduct. Successful firms perceive and respond to a set of environmental 
variables. 
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Theory 
Neoclassical 
microeconomics 
Traditional IO 
economics 
New IO economics 
Behavioural 
economics 
Managerial 
economics 
Agency theory 
Transactions cost 
theory 
Figure 2.2 
Theories of the firm 
[Adapted from Seth & Thomas, 1994, Table 1.] 
Concept of firm Nature of Goals of firm 
environment 
Theoretical: Certain, Maximize profits 
'production deterministic 
function' 
Empirical Certain, Maximize profits 
deterministic 
Theoretical: 'the Various Maximize profits 
strategic player' 
Empirical Uncertain Multiple goals 
Empirical Uncertain Maximize 
managerial 
utility 
Theoretical: 'nexus Uncertain Maximize 
of contracts' shareholder 
wealth 
Theoretical: Uncertain, Maximize profits 
'Governance complex 
structure' 
New 10 economics 
Managers' motives 
behaviour 
Maximize profits/ 
rational 
Maximize profits I 
rational 
Maximize profits/ 
mutual rationality 
Multiple goals/ 
limited 
information 
processing/ 
risk averse 
Self-interest/ 
rational 
Self-interest/ 
information 
assymetries 
Opportunism/ 
bounded 
rationlity 
Newer developments in IO theory have adopted game theory principles so that 
firms are seen as adopting a conduct to effect market structure. Firms make 
[technically] rational decisions to maximise their profits. 
Behavioural theory 
This theory rejects the underlying principles of rational economic man, replacing 
them with an explicit emphasis on the actual process of organisational decision 
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making. The atomistic firm is replaced by .. a collection of individuals with 
multiple goals who operate in a defined structure of authority. The limited ability 
of decision makers to formulate models and to process information is recognised. 
Behavioural rules of 'satisficing' [bounded rationality] replace profit maximizing. 
Resource allocation, output and price decision making are adaptively rational 
with multiple objectives and continuing organisational learning. 
Managerial theories 
A characteristic of large firms is that ownership [shareholders] is separated from 
control [management]. The managerial theories recognise this separation, and 
that managers have power and discretion to pursue activities beneficial to 
themselves rather than the shareholders. The profit maximization motive is 
replaced by maximization of managerial utility which may be achieved through 
size [salesL growth rate, access to resources and other variables. Self interest and 
rationality underly decision making. 
Leibenstein [1978] introduced the concept of 'X-efficiency' to explain why firms do 
not maximize profits. X-inefficiency is the excess of actual costs over minimum 
costs and occurs when competition and environmental elements do not force the 
firm to choose a minimum cost level of output. Leibenstein sees the individual 
as the utility maximizing decision making unit. The individual is able to exercise 
discretionary effort made up of activities, the pace of those activities, their quality, 
and the time sequence of performing them. Each individual will choose that 
combination which maximizes his or her utility. The effort option will only 
coincide with profit maximization if there is appropriate external pressure. 
Agency theory 
Firms come into existence because of the advantages of team production. Agency 
theory assumes contractual relationships rather than authority. Owners delegate 
decision making to their agents [managers]. The problems of self interest are 
reduced by devices [agency costs] such as monitoring, bonding and incentive 
packages, and external disciplines such as competition. 
Transactions cost theory 
Markets and firms are seen as alternative governance structures for completing a 
set of contracts. This theory argues that under some conditions monopoly 
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Figure 2.3 
The transactions cost framework 
atmosphere 
Information 
impactedness 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
FACTORS 
markets are more efficient than competition because of 'information 
impactedness.' [Williamson, 1975] That is, information is not shared equally in a 
market- e.g. a seller has more information about the product than does a buyer. 
If market activities are absorbed into an organisation to become part of the 
hierarchy, then resource allocation, output and price decisions will be based on 
better information and efficiency [reducing transaction costs] will be increased. As 
a result both producers and buyers [the community] will be better off. This theory 
assumes that decision makers have bounded rationality and are opportunistic, 
and that there is uncertainty and complexity in the environment. The interaction 
of these variables leads to information impactedness, and to ex post small 
numbers [i.e. each producer serves a small group of buyers,and vice versa]. 
[Figure 2.3] 
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Summary 
Traditional microeconomic theory has had major influence on the theory of 
organisations, policy and education. For many decades it was a powerful 
influence in the modelling of decisions and the decision process, both for research 
and for application in business organisations. The evidence of the failure of 
reality to match the behaviour of the theoretical firm led to both theoretical and 
empirical research into alternative explanations. Industrial organisation, 
managerial and behavioral theories, and their derivatives have been developed 
as attempts to find explanations which match the reality of economic behaviour. 
All suffer the same two major short-comings : 
• they are uni-dimensional, seeing only the self-interest, monetary 
motivation of persons; 
• they treat the firm, and the individual, as a 'black box', 
disregarding the internal cognitions, motivations and behaviours. 
Contrasting explanations of decision making are offered by sociology and 
psychology. Both fields are also partial-analysis. 
Sociology 
Whilst economics is concerned with the efficient allocation of scarce resources to 
meet the needs of the community, sociology is concerned with the origin, history, 
and constitution of human society. Sociologists approach their problem through 
the study of small groups. 
The sociological research into organisations gained its first major impetus from 
experiments at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric in USA during the 1920s. 
Whilst the research was initiated to find ways of increasing worker productivity it 
found that factory workers are more sensitive to the attitudes of their fellow 
workers than to economic incentives. That is, workers are motivated more by 
belongingness than by utility [monetary] maximization. 
Empirical research into the behaviour of groups advanced rapidly in America 
during the 1930s. [Cartwright & Zander, 1968] Social norms were recognised as 
being simultetneously the product of social interaction, and social stimulii which 
impinge on individual members of a group having those norms. Lewin, et al 
[1939] applied an open systems approach: inputs->processes->outputs. He also 
contributed to the development of a theory of the use of group decisions as a 
means of changing community behaviour. 
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Group behaviour 
Behaviour in work groups is determined by activities, interactions and 
sentiments. [Figure 2.4] This is an open system model in that activities and 
interactions are imposed by the organisation, and sentiments are shaped by self-
interest and motives generated in different groups [family, social, religious, etc]. 
According to Homans [1950], informal groups develop in work organisations 
because emergent behaviours [activities] interactions and sentiments suplant or 
supplement required activities, interactions and sentiments. The group develops 
its own decision goals, criteria and processes because a group 
• is interdependent with its environment for inputs [Figure 2.4] and 
outputs, 
• has interdependence of members, communication and 
interactions among members, interpersonal consensus, and a 
common purpose, and 
• develops norms of behaviour, structure, and roles for its 
members. [Figure 2.5] 
Futhermore membership of informal groups is governed by attraction and 
acceptance. [Figure 2.6] Attraction represents the strength of a person's desire to 
belong to [participate in] a group; acceptance is the willingness of the group to 
accept the person as a member. An individual's membership of the group can 
range from full commitment and internalisation of the purpose and norms of the 
group [psychological membership] to alienation. 
The norms, structure, roles, interdependence, consensus and purpose of the 
group determine its decision making capacity and its decisions. 
Sociological theory building commenced as positivist and inductive, and has also 
developed deductive and normative approaches [compare with economics, Figure 
1.6] Like economics, sociology is atomistic, treating the individual as a 'black box'. 
Psychology and politics approaches look more closely at the cognition and 
behaviour of individuals as decision makers. These approaches will be developed 
in Modules 4 and 5. For the time being we accept the atomistic conception, and in 
Module 2 examine the process of decision making. 
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Figure 2.4 
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"Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do 
they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular 
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at 
purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations.' [Granovetter, 1985: 487] 
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Granovetter criticizes traditional microeconomics as being 'undersocialized ', and 
institutional [industrial organisation economics] and much of sociology as being 
'oversocialized'. The embeddeness view presented by Granovetter [1985: 504-5] is 
that order and disorder, honesty and malfeascence depend on the structure of 
personal relations and networks of relations between and within firms. 
Managers' behaviour which may appear irrational to the neoclassical economist 
is readily seen as rational in terms of sociability, approval, status, and power. That 
is, the behaviour of managers may be rational under the first and second 
definitions on page 10 above, rather than under technical rationality. 
+ 
+ 
Acceptance 
Figure 2.6 
Group membership 
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Module 2: The process 
Chapter 3 The Environment 
Aims of this chapter 
• to understand the complexity of the environment; 
• to be able to describe the environmental domains which surround 
the decision maker; 
• to be able to use the causal textures model to explain the nature of an 
environment. 
Introduction 
The primary focus of this module is the process whereby decisions come into 
being. An integral aspect of this process is the environment surrounding the 
decision maker, both as an individual and as a member of a group. A second 
aspect is the 'finding of' problems to initiate the process. The third is the decision 
process itself. 
Resolving the natue of strategic problems is an important task of upper level 
management. [Lyles & Thomas, 1988] Sometimes the meaning of the bits and 
peices of raw information is immediately evident , more often the manager must 
fashion meaning. [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 23] Decision making does not unfold 
in discrete sequential stages. Lyles and Thomas [1988: 133] summarize four 
emerging ideas about the strategic problem formulation process: 
1. Firms do not explicitly define unanticipated problems. Solution 
generation is often adopted as a means of problem sensing. 
2. ·The complexity of strategic problems leads to differing 
assumptions regarding the nature of these problems. As firms 
spend less time explicitly defining these messy problems, the 
psychological and socio-political dynamics become more 
important. [We will review these aspects in Modules 4 and 5.] 
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3. Individuals will interpret the same situation or environmental 
cues differently. Individuals have many factors influencing their 
perceptions of the cues, and these may lead to cognitive biases in 
the problem formulation process. [Also discussed in Module 4] 
4. Strategic problem formulation is a complex process that starts 
with cues being sensed by individuals. 
The Environment 
"We do not first see, then define, we define first then see." 
[Walter Lippmann] 
Intrusion of 
forces 
Economic 
system 
System inputs 
(information, 
energy, etc.) 
Figure 3.1 
The domain of the organisation 
[Adapted from Harrison, 1987:Figure 5.1, 146] 
Technology 
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The environment of organisational decision making can be mapped in several 
ways. One way is to classify the domains surrounding the decision maker, and 
map the inputs, outputs and influences which penetrate a series of permeable 
boundaries [Harrison, 1987: Figure 5.1, 146]. [Figure 3.1] The nature of the external 
domain [ economic, social, technical and politicalt the group, and the inputs and 
outputs, and the influence of these factors will vary according to the position and 
role of the decision maker. 
A second way to analyse the environmental influence is through mapping its 
texture [Emery & Trist, 1963; McCann & Selsky, 1984; Baburoglu, 1988]. Emery & 
Trist defined four sets of legitimate interconnectednesses within the organisation, 
in the environment, and between the two. [Figure 3.2] These interconnections 
are influenced by the complex and dynamic nature of the environment - the 
contextual texture. This contextual texture influences the nature and difficulty of 
decision making within the organisation. 
Emery & Trist classified four types of domain, and suggested there may be a 
higher, but not yet definable type. Baburoglu [1988] has defined this fifth domain 
type as 'vortical'. [Figure 3.3] The domains range from low complexity and stable 
to highly complex and dynamic. They are described as 
• placid, random. there is low interconnectedness and high stability 
in the environment - much like the economists' model of perfect 
competition. 
• placid, clustered. still highly stable, but with some legitimate 
connections between players in the system. The behaviour of one 
actor will have some impact on the others. 
• disturbed, reactive. not only is there interaction between the 
actors, but the environment is changing at a moderate pace. Any 
actor's behaviour will result in reaction from others. 
• turbulent. highly complex interaction whereby every action will 
cause multiple sets of reactions in a highly dynamic 
environment. 
• vortical. the internal processes of the organisation are unable to 
cope with the contextual complexity and rate of change, 
attempting to withdraw from legitimate interconnectedness. 
In the vortical context the actor's processes L12 and L21 become frozen, while the 
processes of the external field continue to respond dynamically in conjunction 
with the highly complex and interconnected relationships, L22. As a result, a set 
of inappropriate first order responses [superficiality, segmentation, dissociation] 
leads to second order responses [Figure 3.4], including polarisation and freezing of 
the Lll [internal system] processes. The system is attempting to seal itself off from 
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environmental influences. The transactional interdependencies, L12 and L21 
(planning and learning), become intradependencies to be utilized in the 
polarization process. Stalemate occurs when the strategic and tactical actions of 
the organisation fail to influence the enironment. Dogmatism is the refusal to 
believe or accept the messages [information] being received by the organisation. 
Dogmatism and stalemate reinforce each other in cutting off the internal 
processes [Lll] from the external interconnections, contributing to the 
polarisation of values and viewpoints. [Polarisation will be discussed in Module 
5.] 
Figure 3.2 
Lawfull transactional interdependancies of the environmental context 
[Emery & Trist, 1963] 
L12 
L21 
L 11 =system processes 
L 12 = planning/instrumentality processes 
L21 =learning processes 
L22 
L22 = environmental processes, or extended social fields 
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[Emery & Trist, 1965; Baburoglu, 1988] 
f· .. 
Turbulent 
field : 
Disturbed, 
reactive 
Placid,/ 
Placid, ~clustered 
random 
Complexity, 
Connectedness 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-
-
-
. 
Vortical 
An earlier and simpler theory of the hyperturbulent environment suggests that 
two types of domain can emerge: the social enclave and the social vortex. 
[McCann & Selsky, 1984] Turbulence is seen as a relative condition not 
experienced evenly by all members of an environment. Members will attempt to 
partition the environment to allocate and protect their adaptive capacity. The 
successful create social enclaves, comprising less turbulent, more manageable 
social space. A social vortex contains members who collectively lack sufficient 
adaptive capacity relative to prevailing environmental conditions. Social vortices 
are analogous to problem situations for which no perceived realistic solution 
exists in the short run. 
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Figure 3.4 
The second order responses in the vortical environment 
[Baburoglu, 1988] 
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Chapter 4 Finding Problems 
Aims of this chapter 
• to understand how decision situations arise or are found; 
Introduction 
Many poor and wrong decisions are made because decision makers do not 
understand the issues. By understanding the context, the flows and processes of 
decision making, both individuals and groups can make better decisions. There 
are many traps for the unwary [Russo & Schoemaker, 1989], and some examples 
are listed in Figure 4.1. 
The title of Chapter 2 in McCall and and Kaplan [1990] is 'Managerial Problems: 
The Emergence of Meaning'. This is apt: working out what the problem is, is half 
the battle. 
A problem is "a relationship of disharmony between reality and one's 
preferences". [Smith, 1989a: 27] Problems may be positive or negative 
disharmonies, urgent or less pressing. In an organisational context interesting 
problems are always important. 
In Module 1, a decision was defined as a process of reality creation through 
organization members' representations of their own role and activity. The two 
terms intertwine- problems and decisions are inseperable. Further, problem 
identification is not always neatly split from the successive stages in the decision 
process. McCall & Kaplan's finding that problems are evenly spread from 
prepackaged to ill-defined were recorded in Figure 1.2. "The problems managers 
face are, in reality, clusters of information and observations from which meaning 
emerges." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 14] 
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Figure 4.1 
Decision traps 
[From Russo & Schoemaker, 1989] 
Decision Trap #1 
- Plunging in 
Beginning to gather information and reach conclusions 
without first thinking about the crux of the issue, or how 
the decision should be made. 
Decision Trap #2 - Frame blindness 
Setting out to solve the wrong problem, or excluding the 
best solutions, because you created an inappropriate 
mental framework. 
Decision Trap # 3 
- Lack of frame 
control 
Failing to consciously define the problem in more ways 
than one or being unduly influenced by the frames of others. 
Decision Trap #8 - Fooling yourself 
about feedback 
Failing to interpret the evidence about past outcomes for 
what it really says because you are protecting your ego 
or because you are tricked by hindsight effects. 
Decision Trap #1 0 
- Failing to audit your 
decision process 
Failing to create an organized approach to understanding 
your own decision making. 
Attaching meaning 
Smith [1989b: 973], using normative theory and a deductive orientation, provides 
a structure for this emergence of meaning. He splits problem identification into 
three phases. He is prescribing that you- the decision maker- adopt a structured 
framework for problem definition so as to minimize errors. Because definitional 
mistakes will be made, and new information acquired, definitional practice is 
cyclical, including a redefinitional module. The three sequential phases are: 
recognition, development and exploration. The ordering of activities within the 
phases is flexible~ 
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Smith [1989a] found that there are three categories of problem identification 
explanation: problem manifestations, cognitive processes, and organisational 
roles and procedures. Of 70 problems studied, 36 had problem manifestation as 
the strongest factor in ther identification, 21, were best explained by cognitive 
factors, and 13 by organisational effects. He defines problems, including crises and 
opportunities, as "conceptual entities or constructs serving an attention-
allocation purpose." [Smith, 1989a: 27] 
Researchers have traditionally assumed that the diagnostic [problem 
identification] processes involve the active, conscious and intentional efforts of 
decision makers. Dutton [1993: 340] argues that, in fact, there are two modes of 
diagnosis: reflective or active, and unreflective or automatic. 
The automatic mode is used because decision makers confronted with strategic 
issues have limited attentional capacity. An automatic processing mode is a type 
of attentional short-cut, enabling the decision maker to focus on other issues and 
problems. Conditions operating in organisations, and on strategic-level decision 
makers in particular, make an automatic strategic issue diagnosis a dominant 
form. [Dutton, 1993: 341-3] Three sets of conditions effect the use of automatic 
diagnosis: 
• Decision makers connections to the issue: issue familiarity, self-
relevance of the issue, and strength of issue evaluation. 
• Characteristics of the issue context: time pressure, and 
information load. 
• The organisational context: specialization and routinization of 
issue management activities, dominance of [group and 
organisational] norms for consistency, and past performance 
success. 
The automatic diagnosis mode leads to quicker diagnosis, more rapid issue 
responses, and less resiliant issue responses. New issues are seen as old issues, 
activating issue responses that have been used in the past. The schema that 
individuals have in memory, and issue categories embedded in organisational 
routines and procedures serve as important predictors of how decision makers 
will interpret and respond to newly detected strategic issues. [Dutton, 1993:352] 
Patterns in environmental conditions lead people to abandon the automatic 
mode and switch to an active mode. [Louis & Sutton, 1991: 59] Switching to an 
active mode is likely to be provoked by 
• experiencing a novel or previously unknown situation; 
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• discrepancy- a disruption, or an unexpected failure; 
• a deliberate initiative- an explicit question, or an instruction to 
'try something new'. [Louis & Sutton, 1991: 60] 
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Chapter 5 
Process 
Aims of this chapter 
The Decision Making 
• to understand and be able to apply some models of the decision 
making process; 
• to understand that for good decision making the process should 
match the decision subject matter. 
"Problems have no existence except through the managers who act on them. 
. . . The manager acting on a problem is making that problem something 
unique. By the same token, each problem faced, each action taken, shapes 
what the manager will be." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 87] 
"[W]hen decisions are being made ... there is a strong probability that the 
process of deciding upon a similar matter in different organisations will be 
similar. But when it comes to implementation, things do not look that way 
at all. There is no evidence that if the same decisions are taken in two 
similar organisations, even at about the same time, they will be carried out 
in the same way." [Hickson & Miller, 1992: 123] 
"[S]uccessful problem formulators should utilize a process that evokes a 
debate among multiple representations of the nature of the problem." [Lyles 
& Thomas, 1988: 140] 
"[Although] processes of decision making are patterned primarily by what is 
being decided, ... there are considerable differences according to type of 
organization. This is because for the making of decisions an organization is 
the ruling framework governing how a decision can be arrived at." 
[Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995: 655-6] 
Approaches to strategic problem formulation have been classified in several ways. 
[Allison, 1969; Pfeffer, 1981; Shrivastava & Grant. 1985, Lyles & Thomas, 1988] 
Each applies a methodology [paradigm], level of analysis, and selection and 
measurement of variables. Lyles and Thomas [1988] developed a framework for 
comparison of five generic approaches to model building. The framework is a 
useful aid in both understanding theorizing about the process of decision making 
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and in analyzing real decisions. But as was emphasized in Module 1 [page 16], you 
must not confuse the matter being observed with analytical methodology. 
We decide .first; then see. 
The analytical lenses worn by researchers cause them to see the decision making 
process in particular ways. Sometimes this way of seeing will coincide with the 
process being observed. The Lyles & Thomas [1988:135] comparative framework 
comprises criteria, process, biases, assumptions, evidence, and performance 
outcome. They compare five alternative approaches: rational, avoidance, 
adaptive, political, and decisive. Of these, the ratiomtl approach matches the 
rational economic model [Module 1], the adaptive approach approximates the 
process models discussed in this module, the political approach will be discussed 
in Module 5, and the others have similarities with other models outlined in 
Module 1. 
We do not know to what extent the strategic decision making models accurately 
describe the strategic problem formation process and under what conditions. In 
essence, problem formulation in all model types is embedded in the firm's norms 
for organisational decision making and environmental scanning activities. [Lyles 
& Thomas, 1988: 139] 
Mintzberg, et al [1976] used research into 25 decisions to reduce the decision 
process to a sequence of routines and dynamic factors. Their process model 
[classified as 'adaptive' by Lyles & Thomas, 1988: 137] is a useful basis for 
developing understanding of the process of reality creation through organization 
members' representations of their own role and activity [Laroche, 1995: 72; see 
Module 1, page 11] which becomes a decision. This model is presented in a 
modified form in Figure 5.1. The modifications comprise the recognition 
mechanisms [based on Smith, 1989a] and the two types of implementation. 
Recognition of the implementation dichotomy is important because 
implementation with monitoring contributes to the identification mechanisms 
for other decision processes. Thus in modified form this model provides an 
ongoing systems view of the decision making process. 
The Mintzberg model shows that for the most simple, routune [tame] decisions 
the process can flow from recognition through analysis eveluation to 
commitment and implementation. For the more complex decisions there may be 
cycles through any or all of diagnosis, design, search and screen, evaluation and 
choice modes, authorisation, and commitment before implementation. At any of 
these stages there may be interuptions and delays caused by unanticipated events, 
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political impasses, discovery of new options, etc. Managers may choose to speed 
up or delay a particular decision. Mintzberg's research found that the decisions 
took anywhere from a few months to more than four years. 
Whilst the Mintzberg et al [1976] research examined organisational decisions, the 
same pattern can be said to apply whether there is only one person, or several 
involved in making the decision. In Module 4 we will look specifically at how 
individual cognition, [especially schemata and scripts] contributes to recognition, 
and, more generally at the influence on the rest of the decision making process. 
The Bradford Studies 
A major on-going research project carried out by the Bradford Management 
Centre, UK is looking at how decisions are reached 'at the top' and then how they 
are implemented. Numerous papers have been generated to report on this 
research. [Astley, et al, 1982; Hickson, et al, 1986; Cray, et al, 1988; Rowe, 1989; 
Butler, et al, 1991; Hickson & Miller, 1992; Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995] In Module 
4 we see that both formulation and implementation are also dependant on the 
decision maker's script. 
Decision making 
The Bradford Studies were strongly influenced by the Thompson & Tuden [1964] 
model of decision strategies. [Figure 5.2] If outcome preferences and beliefs about 
cause and effect are certain then decision making is a simple computational 
procedure. It is tame. If both preferences and beliefs are uncertain, then only 
inspiration can provide the answer: a wicked problem. In the Bradford Studies 
decisions are classified as problems, interests and processes. [Rowe, 1989: 30] The 
Bradford researchers developed a model in which decision making can vary in 
terms of complexity [intricate, ambiguous, uuncertain, etc] and cleavage [political 
activity arising from the varied interests of participants] 
Where a decision can be programmed, level of complexity and cleavage are low, 
and so are levels of scrutiny, negotiation, discontinuity, and centralization. The 
decision is likely to be made swiftly, and the result is predictable and acceptable to 
all. [Rowe, 1989: 31] Hickson, et al, [cited by Rowe, 1989: 32] found that decision 
making is never a matter solely of calculation, and that there is no 
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cycling 
loops 
Figure 5.1 
A general model of the decision making process 
[Adapted from Mintzberg et al1976] 
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type of process that can be explained by reason of compexity or politicality alone. 
Particular combinations of problems and interests throw up particular processes -
sporadic, constricted and fluid. [Figure 5.3] These can be linked to three kinds of 
subject matter- vortex, tractable and familiar. Both Rowe [1989] and Hickson & 
Miller 1992] describe these processes. 
Rowe makes the point that Thompson & Tuden used a deductive approach, and 
Hickson et al applied induction, building their theory from observation of actual 
decisions. Thompson & Tuden argued that the aim of management is, 
presumably, to maximize the number of calculation decisions, and reduce 
dependency on compromise, judgement and, in particular, inspiration. [Rowe, 
1989: 30] Thus, it is a normative theory. The Hickson et al model is positivist - a 
description of their observations. However, it can be applied in a normative 
manner to advise on what type of decision process should be applied in particular 
environmental contexts. The subject matter [context] and decision process modes 
are: 
• Vortex-sporadic- high on both complexity and politicality. Likely 
to be protracted with disrupting delays. 
• Tractable fluid - less complex and least political. Delays are less 
likely as fewer people are involved. The issues are not likely to be 
serious and the process can be steadily paced, formally channelled 
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and speedy. They set precedents for later decisions. This decision 
type is closest to the 'rational economic man' view. 
• Familiar-constricted - least complex and less political. Normal 
and recurrent situations, unevenly influenced by internal 
interests. There can be considerable discontinuity and delays. 
[Rowe, 1989: 32 
Rowe classifies power as specialist and structural. In Module 5 we identify more 
categories. He suggests the model needs further development: 
1. A decision which may appear straight-forward and non 
controversial to one actor may be viewed differently by other 
actors. 
2. Decision making is an ongoing process: a decision invariably 
involves further subsidiary decisions. A pyramid of decisions 
emerges, and these may be spread across the three modes. 
3. The model presents a static view, detracting from the flow of 
decisions between the cells as the decision process unfolds. 
4. As the process of decision unfolds the nature of power in decision 
making changes. 
Figure 5.3 
Three forms of decision making 
[Rowe, 1989: Figure 4, p33] 
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High 
Implementation 
The process of deciding upon a similar matter is likely to be more similar than 
different in different organisations. However, the impl~menting of an identical 
decision can vary sharply. [Hickson & Miller, 1992: 131] This research is in 
deductive mode, as the authors search for conceptualisation of the reasons for 
success in the implementation phase. 
Implementation is a political process - implementors may act in a self-interested 
way which will confound the intentions of others in the organisation. The 
success of implementation can be measured by four criteria - speed, ease, 
completion, and fulfilment. [Hickson & Miller, 1992: 128] There are three sets of 
reasons which determine successful implementation: 
Decision characteristics complexity, familiarity, and priority; 
Organisational context a degree of crisis, and externalities; 
Political characteristics balance of influence, arrival of a new power-holder. 
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Module 3 Decision models 
Chapter 6 Types of Models 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to appreciate the different types of models used in decision making; 
• to be able to decide when it is appropriate to use models; 
Introduction 
A model is an explicit statement of our image of reality - a representation of the 
aspects of the decision with which we are concerned. It presents reality in a 
simplified, organized form. If successful, modelling will 
• enhance the decision maker's understanding of the decision, 
• stimulate creativity in the search for possible solutions to the 
problem, and 
• help in the evaluation of alternative courses of action. [Cooke & 
Slack, 1991: 135] 
There is a danger that modelling will also lead to inappropriate application of 
standard techniques, and reinforcement of pre-existing biases. 
Modelling of decisions is not as obviously appropriate and straightforward as 
economic rationalists would have us believe. Admittedly, some of their models 
are highly complex, but this does not mean that they are necessarily either cost-
effective or realistic. The modelling techniques used by different persons, and in 
different situations are likely to be different due to the individual schemata, 
personality, values, etc [Module 4], and to the differing subject matters and 
environmental textures [Module 2]. 
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The two process models [Mintz berg et al and Bradford Studies] presented in 
Module 2 are indicative of the range of textures and processes that exist. 
The factors contributing to individual decision behaviour will be discussed in 
Module 4. For the present module we need only to clarify the meaning of a few 
terms. 
Schemata- active cognitive structures which frame problems [Neisser, 1976], 
cognitive representations of attributes and the relationships between them 
which constitute common-sense social theories [Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977], or 
abstract conceptions people hold about the social world [Taylor & Crocker, 
1983]. [all cited in Schwenk, 1988: 46] 
Cognitive map - a concept about aspects of the decision environment and beliefs 
about cause-and-effect relationships between them; interpretive lenses which 
help decision makers select certain aspects of an issue as important for 
diagnosis. [Tolman, 1948 cited in Schwenk, 1988: 45] 
Assumptions- the basic elements of a decision maker's frame of reference or 
world view. [Mason & Mitroff, 1981 cited in Schwenk, 1988: 45] 
An individual's schemata are shaped by the assumptions and cognitive map. 
When several people in a community share schemata thaey define what is 
legitimate in terms of knowledge and techniques of analysis in a particular field of 
study- a paradigm. [See Module 1] 
A diversion to the need for a new way of thinking 
In Module 1 you were diverted down a trail to consider the world of ignorance, 
paradigms, and rationality. These concepts are important in understanding our 
approaches to decision making. They are just as important when it comes to 
thinking about models. This diversion, however, follows a different path- the 
philosophy underlying our paradigms. 
Success, whether purely economic or more general requires that one be able to 
examine models from multiple perspectives. The paradox of modelling was 
clearly stated by Alvin Toffler: 
"Today, whether dealing with the economy, health costs, strategic arms, 
budget deficits, toxic waste, or tax policy behind almost every major political · 
issue we find teams of modelers and counter-modelers supplying the raw 
material for this kind of controversy. 
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A systematic model can help us visualize complex-phenomena. It consists of 
a list of variables, each of which is assigned a weight based on its presumed 
significance. Computers make it possible to build models with much larger 
numbers of variables than the unaided intellect alone. They also help us to 
study what happens whenthe variables are given different weights or 
interrelated in different ways. , 
But no matter how 'hard' the final output may appear, all models are 
ultimately, and inescapably, based on 'soft' assumptions. Moreover, 
decisions about how much importance to assign to any given variable, or its 
weighting, are frequently 'soft', intuitive or arbitrary." [Tofler, 1990: 291-292, 
quoted in Mitro££ & Linstone, 1993: 38] 
Every type of rationality is completely dependent on all others. For example, each 
of the economic, legal, political, and social concepts of rationality have been 
thought, by their advocates, to be separate and primary. However, it has been 
shown that each of these concepts presupposes the others. There can not, for 
example be a 'basic economic yardstick' unless there is a preexisting, stable society, 
a well-accepted legal framework, and a series of accepted social strata. [Mitro££ & 
Linstone, 1993: 170] Hence, models developed within any particular science are 
embedded in the concepts of rationality of all other sciences. Models can be 
helpful, and also very dangerous. 
Mitro££ & Linstone [1993:171] conclude that 
• every science is to be found within every other; 
• every model presupposes every other model; 
• every problem is to be found within every other problem; 
• a broader sense of aesthetics and ethics are two of the most vital 
aspects of every problem; and [page 153] 
• we cannot hope to find solutions to our problems if we persist in 
our old ways of thinking. [My emphasis.] 
Types of Models 
"A good model is one which reflects accurately our perceptions of the 
decision area and can be used to aid the decision process in one of ... three 
ways" [Cooke & Slack, 1991: 129] 
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The three ways are description, analogy and relationship. Models can also be 
classified into verbal and conventional 'scientific' [Figure 6.1] The six generic 
types of model are [Cooke & Slack, 1991: 127-129]: 
Level 
Descriptive 
Analogy 
Relationship 
Figure 6.1 
Generic types of models 
[Cooke & Slack, 1991: Figure 5.1, p 130] 
Verbal Scientific 
Description of what Iconic models - the scale 
the observer perceived of reality is changed and 
some properties are 
ignored 
Comparison of the Analogue models - one 
observed situation set of properties are 
with an analogous represented by another 
situation 
Influence relationships Symbolic models -
between elements of mathematical symbols, 
the observed situation letters and numbers are 
are implied or used to convey the 
described relationships 
• verbal description - a summary of what the observer has observed 
in the decision making context. It will be subject to the exclusion 
of some information, and compression or aggregation of 
comments, reactions, events and entities. Some information is 
lost, and what remains will be biased. 
• comparison, or verbal analogue - representing one set of 
properties by another; e.g. 'like a stick bending until it finally 
snapped' to describe one side in a negotiating situation. Analogies 
rely on implication and association to describe the underlying 
structure of a problem, and may, or may not, be valid . 
. • Influence relationship - a description of the cause-effect 
relationship observed, or perceived. 
• Iconic- a 'scale' model representing the reality. Some aspects of 
that reality are excluded; e.g. the icons on your computer screen, 
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or a model of a house which can not show the cost of components 
used to build it. 
• Analogue- one set of properties is represented by another; e.g. a 
graph, diagram or map. 
• Symbolic- a quantified relationship model such using 
mathematical symbols, musical notes, etc. 
The type of model chosen is dependent on the system to be modelled, the purpose 
of the model, and the schemata, cognitive map and assumptions of the decision 
maker or modeller. Scientific models can also be classified as: 
descriptive/predictive, specific/ general, local/ global, and steady state/ dynamic. 
Statistical techniques can be used in all levels of scientific modelling. 
Some useful, simple models 
Complex analytical techniques are not always essential. For example [Cooke & 
Slack, 1991:247-256]: 
Scatter diagrams - To examine the connection between two variables, simply plot 
the observation points on a graph. The diagram will show whether there is a 
relationship, and its shape. It will not reveal cause-effect. 
Categories of causes, 
and specific causes 
Figure 6.2 
Fishbone diagram 
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percent 
of effects 
Figure 6.3 
Pareto diagram 
possible causes 
Fishbone [cause-effect] diagrams - assist in the research for the root causes of 
problems. You ask the what, when, where, who, how and why questions, 
adding possible answers. [Figure 6.2] 
Pareto diagrams- arranging information on the types of problem or causes of a 
problem in their order of importance. A cumulative chart will have the shape 
shown in Figure 6.3- representing the 80-20 rule. 
Why-why analysis - state the problem and ask why it occured. Then ask why for 
each of the causes and so on. 
Network analysis- the process of considering a major task as a series of 
component activities, with time estimates for each, interactions between them, 
their costs, and, if necessary, allocation of 
task [cost, 
responsibility] 
Figure 6.4 
Gantt Chart 
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i 
time 
responsibilities. A critical path network cali: be used for the most complex 
projects. A Gantt Chart is a simple representation of work flows, and can also 
show costs and responsibilities. [Figure 6.4] Computer software is available for 
both. 
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Chapter 7 
Modelling 
Aims of this Chapter: 
Th·e Process of 
• to understand some model building techniques; 
• to be aware of chaos, and its implications for modelling in decision 
making. 
Prerequisites of a good model are: 
• awareness of the objectives of the organisation and/ or key 
individuat and the constraints or parameters set by other 
stakeholders and the general environment; 
• understanding of the key variables within the decision context; 
• knowledge of the cause-effect pattern of influence between the 
variables; 
• appreciation of how mathematical formulation can be used to 
formulate powerful models, and of when models can or should be 
used. 
The modelling process abstracts from reality, identifying the key elements, 
including objectives, and their relationships. 
Variables 
An inherent characteristic of decisions is that elements in the situation can take 
on different values. These elements are variables. In developing models we 
assume that some of these variables are either constants or parameters. These 
simplifying assumptions are necessary because of the limited cognitive capaacity 
of the brain, and the limited resources availaible for model building, including 
computer systems. A parameter is a variable which is assumed to have a constant 
value over the period of time studied or the range of options considered. The 
paradigms of each research community govern the allocation of status - variable, 
parameter, constant- to the elements of the subject matter of the decision. Thus 
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different decision makers [and researchers] may use alternative status sets for any 
one decision situation. 
Variables may also be classified as 
• input, independent, exogenous, or 
• output, dependent, endogenous. 
The input variables are either uncontrollable -factors pre-existing in the 
environment, or controllable - the factors about which the decision is to be made. 
Uncontrollable input variables are usually probablistic- the value is unknown 
and our belief about them can be represented by a probability distribution. They 
may also be deterministic - it is possible, or we believe it is preferable, to apply a 
specific value. Output veriables are dependent on the input variables and the 
assumptions and characteristics of the model used. [Figure 7.1] 
Figure 7.1 
The generic form of a model 
[Adapted from Cooke & Slack, 1991: Figure 5.3, p 132] 
Input 
variables 
[controllable] 
Parameters 
& Constants 
[assumptions 
about 
uncontrollable 
variables] 
/ 
The Model 
[Assumed elationships and 
intermediate or 'state' variables] 
Output 
[dependent or 
endogenous 
variables] 
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Classification of decision models 
Cooke & Slack [1991: 151] classify numerate models on two vectors: according to 
the type of solution sought, and the degree of uncertainty represented by the 
model. Examples of each type are shown in Figure 7.2. Cooke & Slack discuss 
these [1991: 136-150] and Jennings & Wattam [1994: 148-173] also provide examples 
of linear programming, risk analysis, and statistical techniques. Summary statitics 
-actual numbers, averages dispersion, etc- are included as deterministic/ 
optimising in Figure 7.2 as they can be used to assist in choosing between 
alternatives when whole populations are measured. 
The various types of decision models are more popular in some cultures than 
others. For example, decision analysis developed in the USA in the late 1960s, but 
was not widely used in the UK in the late 1980s. [Pearman, 1987] This appears to 
be because early development at Harvard and Stanford universities could be 
easily transferred through academia and into business in America by students of 
the initial researchers. Transfer to other countries is more difficult. Decision 
analysis grew out of decision tree techniques [economic statistics] with the 
addition of techniques from other disciplines, particularly cognitive psychology. 
Decision analysis requires both technical knowledge and flair, and is largely the 
province of consultants. For an organisation to use the techniqe independently a 
'critical mass' of skilled and experienced employees is necessary. [Pearman, 
1987:777] Increasing availability of, computer software intended for non-
specialists is making the technique more widely available. 
Howard [1988: 680] describes decision analysis as 
Optimizing 
Satisficing 
Figure 7.2 
Classification of decision models 
[Based on Cooke & Slack, 1991: Figure 5.19, p 151] 
Deterministic Probabilistic 
• Linear programming • Decision trees 
• Decision analysis 
• Corporate modelling • Queing theory 
• Heuristic models • Statistical analysis 
• Summary statistics • Stochastic simulation 
• Risk analysis 
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"a systematic procedure for transforming opaque decision problems into 
transparent decision problems by a sequence of transparent steps to provide 
such clarity of insight into the problem that thedecision-maker will 
undertake the recommended action." 
The first step is to fit a formal model to the opaque real situation. Evaluation and 
appraisal follow with iterative cycles for refinement. [Figure 7.3] Evaluation and 
appraisal include the preferences of the decision maker and sensitivity analysis. 
Intelligent decision systems 
Howard suggests combining the decision analysis process with an expert system to 
form an intelligent decision system. [Figure 7.4] An expert system uses the 
computer as an artificial intelligence designed with the help of an expert in the 
field. It is descriptive and positive. Decision analysis is normative. Combined 
they provide a powerful tool which manages the interaction with the decision 
maker, and carries-out the formulation, evaluation, and explanation functions. 
The decision maker provides alternaties, preferences, and information; and 
receives recommendations and insights. [Howard, 1988: 694] 
Chaos 
Chaos appears to be common in social environments. [Gregersen & Sailer, 
1993:792] Evidence of this began emerging in the late 1980s. 
There are two useful indicators of chaos in social systems: 
• highly iterative, recursive, or dynamic structures that change over 
time often exhibit chaotic behaviour over some part of their 
domain. 
• highly discontinuous behaviour in the system. [Gregersen & 
Sailer, 1993: 779] 
Some implications of the presence of chaos have significance for modelling in 
decision making: 
1. Cross-sectional studies are unlikely to discover and model chaotic behaviour, 
which occurs through time. 
2. Poor analytical results are to be expected when analyzing chaotic systems with 
standard statistical mea&ures. In chaotic systems, entities with similar starting 
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points and environments can end up behaving differently. Refining the 
statistical methods can not improve the predictive accuracy; some other 
technique is needed. 
Figure 7.3 
The decision analysis process 
[Howard, 1988: Figure 1, p 680] 
Refine Evaluate 
Appraise 
3. Simulation techniques will not mimic any specific actual system. If the core 
problem lies near the boundary between divergent and non-divergent 
domains of the system, predictive techniques are bound to fail and the only 
way to know how the actual phenomenon will behave is to watch it behave. 
4. Statistical methodology will play a different role : e.g. providing 'good' data. 
5. Qualitative methods will increase in importance - the 'verbal' column in 
Figure 6.1 above. 
6. Social science must develop a definition of 'understanding' relevent to chaotic 
systems. Gregersen & Sailer, 1993: 793-798] 
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Refine 
Figure 7.4 
An intelligent decision system 
[Howard, 1988: Figure 8, p 693] 
Appraise 
Decision 
analysis 
expert 
system 
This required definition of understanding will have much in common with the 
definition of rationality as 'reality testing' [Module 1, page 10] 
Traditionally, economic theory has assumed that, in the long run, an economy 
will be in a stationary state [equilibrium], or balanced growth. Aperiodic motion 
was not considered, and the cause of divergence was seen to be random shocks. 
Economic data is clearly aperiodic. Non-linear dynamics [chaos theory] can 
provide a better explanation. [Kelsey, 1988: 2, 21] Simon's view of economic man 
as satisficing, rather than optimizing is more compatable with this reality. 
Jennings & Wattam [1994: 174] suggest a relationship between linear behaviour 
and· chaotic behaviour of the form 
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Order -> Complexity -> Chaos. 
Recognition of the presence of chaos in social systems has important implications 
for the use of models as aids to decision making. 
Conclusion 
A model is a representation of our image of reality. As such it is abstraction and 
simplification. Because chaos is present in some domains comprising the 
decision makers environment, complex, dynamic models are required to present 
an accurate representation of this environment, the input variables, the processes, 
and outcomes of decisions. In these very complex, chaotic situations quantitative 
modelling may not be practical due to the very high cost. It may also be the case 
that intuition and judgement are superior decision techniques. 
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Module 4·. Individual 
decision behaviour 
Aims of this module: 
• to be able to discuss the factors influencing individual decision 
making. 
Chapter 8 Personality 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to be aware of three definitions of personality and how they 
contribute to our understanding of the managerial decision maker; 
• to understand how perception effects decision making; 
• to understand the nature of barriers to perception. 
Introduction 
Our behaviour, including our individual decision making is influenced by 
philosophical and psychological forces. In Module 1 you were asked to consider 
the philosophy - the idea of ignorance as the basis of learning and knowledge, 
paradigms, and three alternative definitions of reality. The idea that every model 
presupposes other models was presented in Module 3. 
Also, in Module 1 we examined various approaches to decision making from the 
fields of economics and sociology. These approaches all assume a causal 
relationship: if A, then B. They are also atomistic. That is both economics and 
sociology perceive their unit of study, be it the household, the firm, or the group, 
as a unitary decision maker. Psychology disputes this, and highlights the fact that 
individuals differ from each other, and these differences affect the decision 
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making process. [Figure 8.1] This was hinted at in Module 2, and we now 
examine the inside of the 'black box' more closely. 
Figure 8.1 
The place of psychology in the modeling of decisions 
The common objective of all models and theories is to adduce 
cause and effect relationships of the form: 
If A then B 
As models or theories of decision making, economics, sociology, 
politics, etc all have this form. 
Whatever the A ........ B relationship there is an 
intervening field: 
A psychological 
field 
This intervening field is a model of man which will vary 
according to context. It includes: 
personality motivation 
perceptions aspirations 
etc 
B 
In this Module we explore some aspects of psychology which help us to achieve 
understanding of how decisions are made. Psychology is the science that deals 
with mental processes and behaviour. It is the branch of metaphisics that studies 
the soul, the mind, and the relationship of life and mind to the functions of the 
body. The topics to be discussed are personality, perception and memory, risk 
preference, and decision styles. 
Nutt [1989] suggests that decision making represents a learned psychological 
process which is both shaped by the concept of reality and intertwined with 
personality. His view is that the influence of personality is an amalgam of 
childhood experiences and memories, a persistent inner direction, and the 
transformation of external reality. 
Do you know who you are? 
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Our ordinary concept of consciousness seems to be anchored in two seperable sets 
of considerations - the inner, or 'from the inside', and the outer, or 'from the 
outside'. From the inside, our own consciousness seems obvious and pervasive. 
Each of us knows what it is like to be 'me'. However, we can only know others 
from the outside, and we accept 'outside ' indicators as symptoms of whatever is 
the 'me' of those others. [Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981: 8-10] 
In 1962, the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges wrote 
"my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs to oblivion, 
or to him. 
I do not know which of us has written this page." [quoted in Hofstadter & 
Dennett, 1981: 20] 
Borges seems to himself to be two people, the public personage and the private 
person. He is expressing uncertainty as to which personage is dominating his 
consciousness. [Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981: 20] Another similar viewpoint is that 
the mind is somehow separate from the rest of the person: 
"do I navigate my way through life with the help of my mind, or does my 
mind navigate its way through life by the help of me? I am not sure who is 
in charge." [Schelling, 1988: 356] 
Schelling describes the mind as a consuming organ. We consume by thinking. 
We consume past events from memory, we consume contemporary 
circumstances, and future events through imagination. Because the mind is 
distracted by its 'play' activities, it is inefficient in its information processing role. 
When it is time to make a decision, the individual's brain may both selectively 
illuminate his or her preference map and selectively recall information. 
[Schelling, 1988: 354-356] 
Decision making is a learned psychological process which is both shaped by the 
concept of reality and intertwined with personality. As was suggested in Module 
1, in discussing concepts such as 'decision', we impose our own subjective 
paradigm view of the reality under discussion. It is convenient to explain life, 
including organisational life, in terms of intention or goal, choice, and significant 
events. But, underlying these are a myriad of contending subprocesses, present in 
every cognitive act, which make present a version of reality. [Chia, 1994: 802] 
A decision is an interactive series of gloriously coloured microcosmic operations 
and 'being there' which bring forth and insistently make present a version of 
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reality. [Chia, 1994; Langley, et al, 1995, Laroche, 1995] This 'being there' can be 
described in a number of ways depending on the personality of the participant, 
and of the observer. 
Personality 
Personality is 
"a consistent pattern of attitudes and behavior or at least an 'orderly 
arrangement' in the behavior of those we know." [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 5] 
The influence of personality on decision making can be described as an amalgam 
of childhood experiences and memories, a persistent inner direction, and the 
transformation of external reality. Understanding of personality can be achieved 
through theory, empirical research, and personality change. Personality change 
may be naturally occuring developmental changes over time or planned change 
when 'problems' arise. The latter is not of interest for this course. 
There are many alternative definitions of personality. Three generic categories 
are: psychoanalitic [Freudian, Jungian], dispositional [trait theory, motivation 
theory L and phenomenological [holistic approach]. 
Psychoanali tic 
Freud [1836-1939] initially organized personality according to level of awareness: 
unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. Later he divided personality into three 
basic functions: 
• Id - the basic drives for pleasure and aggression. It derives power 
directly from bodily needs and processes. 
• Ego - the rational part which tries to satisfy the desires of the id 
within the constraints of the real world. The ego develops out of 
the id. 
• Superego- the social and moral arbitrator of the psychic system. 
It suppresses the impulses of the id and persuades the ego to 
attend to moral rather than realistic goals. 
The three components are in constant conflict, and these conflicts are resolved in 
the preconscious or unconscious. Therefore indirect methods of assessing 
personality are necessary. 
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Freud saw early childhood experiences as critical in determining adult 
personality, and believed that identifiable character types result from libido being 
fixated at each stage of psychosexual development. [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 65] 
Jung [1875-1961] targetted middle age as a critical period in a person's life. At this 
time people undergo a major transition from youthful impulsiveness and 
extroversion to thoughtfulness and introversion - they experience a midl~fe 
crisis. 
Erickson [1902-] emphasized the influence of society and culture on personality 
development, and recognized three stages in adult life: young adulthood, 
adulthood, and maturity. He outlined eight stages of psychosocial development, 
essentially extending the Freudian stages through adolescence and adulthood. 
Erickson's description of the stages focuses on the way the person deals with the 
issue that is the central conflict of the stage. [Figure 8.2] Each of the conflicts is 
present at all stages. For example, 'industry v inferiority' is the dominant conflict 
during the latency period. It begins with school life. Children at this stage must 
begin to apply themselves to their learning, to begin to feel some sence of 
competence. 'Identity v role confusion' is the confidence that others see us as we 
see ourselves, and is related to choice of occupation. If identity is not formed, role 
confusion may occur. If the earlier conflicts are not suitably handled, despair may 
result in later life. To have a lasting sense of identity the person must develop 
each of the adaptive qualities of the other seven stages. 
Dispositional 
In reviewing the managerial and organisational cognition litrature, one 
researcher concludes that 
"dispositional attributes of key decision makers seem to matter in the 
conduct of firm performance in ways that economists and sociologists might 
not envision." [Walsh, 1995: 290] 
Trait theory 
Early dispositional views assumed that people could be divided into a relatively 
small number of types according to their personalities. Trait theory researchers 
fragment human personality into a number of isolated variables which are then 
organised into a small number of basic and independent factors for analysis. The 
individual is held apart from the environment. Personality is a unique set of 
traits which each individual possesses. Personalities are assumed to be relatively 
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stable and enduring within an individual, and also consistent and general to 
some extent. 
Figure 8.2 
The eight stages of psycosocial development 
[Adapted from Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: Figure 8.1, page 80, 
which is adapted from Erickson, 1963 and 1968) 
Developmental 
period 
Maturit y 
Adulthoo d 
g Youn 
adul t 
Puberty & 
ado1escenc e 
Latenc y 
e Locomoto 
-genita 1 
r Muscu1a 
-an a1 
1-Ora 
sensory 
EvD 
Ge vS 
In vIs 
IdvR 
Ind v Inf 
iffiit v G 
AvSh 
BtvM 
I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Psychosocial stages 
Bt v M basic trust v mistrust 
A v Sh autonomy v shame 
Init v G initiative v guilt 
Ind v Inf industry v inferiority 
Id v R identity v role confusion 
In v Is intimacy v isolation 
Ge v S generativity v stagnation 
E v D ego integrity v despair 
A trait is a pattern of action and reaction, and may be common or unique, surface 
or deep. Some examples relevent to managerial decision making are: 
• drive -willing to take initiative, possessing high energy, and 
desire for achievement: 
• integrity - being truthful, and consistent in words and deeds; 
• self confidence - decisive and assertive. 
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Dispositions [personalities] are theoretical construCts and can not be measured 
directly. Researchers devise and apply measures of behaviour that yield 
indicators of various underlying dispositions. 
Allport [1897-1967] asserted that 
i traits exist within the person; 
11 traits are more generalized than habits; 
111 traits direct action and do not require energising from elsewhere; 
i v traits may be established empirically; 
v traits are interdependent; 
vi traits are not synonomous with moral or social judgement; 
vii traits may be examined within the individual personality, or 
across populations; 
viii Acts that are inconsistent with a trait are not proof of the non-
existence of that trait. [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 175] 
Using empirical analysis of several hundred people Cattell [1905-] identified 16 
major factors which represent the major dimensions of differences in human 
personality. [Figure 8.3] These factors are distilled from many statements about 
the individuals, and are culturally biased- a researcher in a non-USA culture 
may have developed different sets of factors from a similar survey. 
Eysnick [1916- ] claims that to a considerable extent major dispositions are 
heritable. 
Motivation 
Motivation theorists claim that a person's behaviour is motivated by that 
person's needs. Individual needs vary in both kind and amount. The 
psychoanalytic model of personality emphasized the similarity of motivations of 
all people. Motivation theories identify and elaborate the differences between 
individuals in terms of the strength of their motives and how they are 
manifested. [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 230-231] 
Murray [1893- ] believes that the individual and environment must be considered 
together, but for analysis, the individual forces [needs] and environmental forces 
[pressures] must be separated. 
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Figure 8.3 
Sixteen major factors in the analysis of personality 
[Cattell, R. B. (1965). The Scientific Analysis of Personality. 
Baltimore: Penguin; reproduced in Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 197] 
Low-score description High-score description 
[negative] [positive] 
.. ... 
reserved A outgoing 
less intelligent B more intelligent 
emotional c stable 
humble D assertive 
sober E happy-go-lucky 
expedient F conscientious 
shy .G venturesome 
tough-minded H tender minded 
trusting I suspicious 
practical J imaginative 
forthright K shrewed 
placid L apprehensive 
conservative M experimenting 
group-tied N self-sufficient 
casual 0 controlled 
relaxed Q tense 
.. ... 
Needs are sometimes manifest and sometimes latent. The strength of a need 
must be measured in both forms. McClelland and his colleagues developed a 
process of measuring motives such as achievement, power, and affiliation. They 
focused on the need to achieve. Winter [1939-] has focused on the need for 
power. 
McClelland has developed a formal course for developing achievement 
motivation in businesspeople. Winter claims that the goal of the power motive 
is the status of having power. Some people hope for power, others have a fear of 
power. People with a high need for power share certain characteristics: 
• Presentation of self - control of people, possessions, situations 
expressed through force, prestige possessions, or the 
embelishment of one's products. 
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• Selection of friends - gather i:r group of followers who are not 
popular or well known, and are generous and understanding to 
those people, while displaying a competitive stance to outsiders. 
• Relative indifference to time and risk. 
• A high degree of emotional arousal in situations that arouse 
power motivation but do not allow power to be exercised. 
• Sexual behaviour- power motivated men have sex at an earlier 
age, or say they did, and prefer a partner who is dependent. 
• Alcoholism- dependence on alcohol to satisfy the need for power 
distinguishes the alcoholic from the non-alcoholic. [Alcohol 
increases the feeling of power.] [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 252-256] 
Phenomeno-logical 
The individual's grasp of objects and events largely determines human 
behaviour: what is real to the individual is what is in the person's individual 
frame of reference. That is, perception is a subjective act; effective reality is reality 
as it is perceived. [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 271-273] A distinguishing 
characteristic of the phenomenolgical [holistic] approach is that humans are 
rational in their responses to the world as they perceive it. This implies that 
actions derive from conscious awareness. 
There are two basic approaches: the self-actualisation approach of Rogers and 
Maslow, and the personal constructs approach of Kelly and Lewin. 
Hierarchy of needs 
Maslow's [1908-1970] hierarchy of needs is based on Rogers [1902-] two major 
assumptions: 
"(1) human behaviour is guided by each person's unique self-actualising 
tendency and (2) all humans need positive regard.'' [Liebert & Spiegler, 1987: 
287] 
Maslow conceptualizes motivation in terms that are common to us all. He 
postulates five levels of basic human needs which occur in order of decreasing 
strength. [Figure 8.4] The lower needs are relatively uniform for all people, but 
the nature of self-actualisation needs varies from person to person. Each person 
has a unique potential to develop, grow, and change. This is that person's 
personality. 
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Construct theory 
Figure 8.4 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs 
Self-actualization 
Esteem 
Belongingness and love 
Security and safety 
Physiological 
weakest 
strongest 
Kelly [1905-1967] discovered that an individual could change abnormal behaviour 
if he or she was helped to change his or her interpretations so as to see 
themselves and the world diferently. Kelly suggested that we see the world 
through transparent patterns or constructs. Each person has a unique set of 
constructs. While these constructs may seem the same for different people, this is 
due to weaknesses of language- we can not express the subtle nuances. 
Differences between people are due to differences in how they construe events. 
Individuals observe the behaviour [and personality] of others through their own 
constructs. 
Each of these approaches- psychoanalitic, dispositional, and phenomenological -
offers explanation of personality in action. They provide different approaches to 
explaining what happens inside the 'black box'. 
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Chapter 9 Cognition 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to be aware of the importance of divergent thinking; 
• to understand the role of memory in the decision making process; 
How do managers impose meaning on the stimuli they encounter? 
The American Heritage College Dictionary [1993] defines cognition as the mental 
process or faculty of knowing, including aspects such as awareness, perception, 
reasoning, and judgement. A person's personality will influence his or her 
cognition. Aspects of cognition, such as perception and memory, influence the 
processes and outcomes of reasoning and judgement. The next two sections focus 
on these. 
Perception 
"We do not first see, then define, we define first and then see." 
Lippmann] 
[Walter 
"the problems managers face are, in reality clusters of information and 
observations from which meaning emerges ...... a problem is what you make 
of it." [McCall & Kaplan, 1991: 14] 
The information worlds faced by managers are extremely complex, ambiguous, 
and munificent. [Mason & Mitro££, 1981; Mintzberg, et al, 1976; Schwenk, 1984, 
cited in Walsh, 1995: 280] Managers, in fact all individuals, must find their way 
through a bewildering flow of information to make decisions. They do so by 
employing knowledge structures, or schema, to represent their information 
worlds, and thus facilitate information processing and decision making. Hogarth 
[1987: 135] suggests that the mind not only receives information, but actively seeks 
information to incorporate within existing notions and thought patterns. Thus 
our relationship with information is both passive and proactive. Recall the quote 
from Schelling [above]- is my mind using me in its journey, or am I in control? 
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Elements of perception 
As Lippmann said so effectively, we see the world as probabalistic because we are 
unable to see and comprehend the myriad factors that cause events to occur: our 
perception is selective. McCall & Kaplan [1991: 2] draw attention to the flow and 
process elements of perception. 
Flow is the way in which information gets sorted, filtered, and organized. It 
comprizes the organisation's formal management information system [MIS], 
corporate values, a manager's passive and proactive relationships with other 
people, and the manager's experience. The organisational aspects of the flow 
of information are determined by past and present managers to organise and 
simplify the huge volume of potentially available information, and affect the 
information available to the manager. 
Process is the limited processing capability and bias, simplification through 
mental maps, emotional involvement, collaboration and negotiation practised 
by managers. 
Perceptual barriers 
Because of the limitations of the humn brain individuals must use simplification 
processes. However, we all, to greater or lesser extent, also apply perceptual 
barriers such as: 
• using overly-restrictive problem barriers; 
• inability to isolate the specific problem; 
• ignoring familiar sensory input [saturation]; 
• failure to use all of the senses; 
• stereotyping; 
• functional myopia; 
• difficulty in seeing remote relationships. 
The first two of these barriers are essentially opposites, having to do with how we 
set parameters around the identification activity. The third relates to the dulling 
of our most used senses- especially sight and sound. In reading, in particular, we 
have a tendency to see what we expect to find. Also, we often use only one or two 
of the six senses when we should try to make use of all or most of them. The 
senses are : sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, and intuition. Researchers have 
found that smell has the most lasting impact in human memory. Individuals 
trained in the ;hard' sciences are taught that intuition is not analytical and should 
be ignored in decision mak~g. However, it is a proven part of perception, and 
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researchers such as Mintzberg [1976] and Isenberg [1984] have shown the 
importance of intuition and creativity in the decision making of senior managers. 
Stereotyping is the tendency to classify experiences into familiar categories. New 
information is seen to be the same as information previously categorized. 
Functional myopia is failure to perceive that articles have multiple possible uses. 
For example, paper clips may be used to hold papers together, to make into a 
chain, as misssiles, to scratch a surface, etc. The difficulty in seeing remote 
relationships is similar, in that we fail to see a relationship between separate 
pieces of information. 
Many researchers have listed cognitive heuristics and biases which may adversly 
affect decision making. Hogarth [1980] described twenty nine separate biases. Both 
Schwenk [1988: 44] and McCall & Kaplan [1991: 26] have presented selections of 
those most likely to affect decision making. [Figure 9.1] Only three items appear 
in both lists, suggesting something about the perceptual bias of these authors. 
Figure 9.1 
Heuristics and biases as perceptual barriers 
in decision making 
Bias I Source of bias Selected heuristics and biases 
[McCall & Kaplan,l990: 26] [Schvvenk, 1988:44] 
Availability* Availability* 
Selective perception* Selective perception* 
Concrete information Illusory correlation 
Data presentation Conservatism 
Inconsistency Law of small numbers* 
Law of small numbers* Regression bias 
Complexity Wishful thinking 
Gambler's fallacy Illusion of control 
Logical reconstruction 
Hindsight bias 
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Divergent and convergent thinking 
A number of researchers have suggested divergent thinking, or creativity 
techniques, as means for improving the processes of awareness and perception. 
[de Bono, 1982; Raudsepp, 1983; Smith & Ainsworth, 1989] Convergent thinking 
is the conventional functionalist approach to decision making - identify elements 
of the problem and alternative possible solutions, evaluate these alternatives and 
choose between them. Divergent thinking is essentially a reversal of this process. 
As is shown in Figure 9.2, divergent thinking commences with exploration for 
the 'real' problem, then exploration for possible answers. In decision making, 
divergent thinking should always preceed convergent .thinking. 
Figure 9.2 
The nature of divergent and convergent thinking 
[Smith & Ainsworth, 1989: 25] 
DIVERGENT THINKING 
I think there is 
a problem here 
CONVERGENTTHrnNKING 
Elements of 
the problem, 
alternatives or 
possible answers 
These are all 
interesting 
possible 
answers 
to explore 
Theone 
correct 
answer 
Some of the techniques we can consciously use to stimulate divergent thinking 
are: 
• generate alternatives; 
• challenge assumptions; 
• suspend judgement; 
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• visual description; 
• fractionation; 
• reversal [from the problem stated, or solution given, seek for 
causes rather than alternatives; 
• brainstorming; 
• analogies and metaphores; 
• choice of entry point; 
• random simulation; 
• polarization, or arguing the opposite view. 
Memory 
"Memory is the store that provides many if not most of the inputs to 
decision making. It is therefore important to understand how the store is 
organized and, in particular, the manner in which information can become 
distorted." [Hogarth, 1987: 133] 
Memory affects reasoning and judgement through the selection of cues, the 
structuring of judgemental tasks, the choice of decision rules, and the 
interpretation and coding of outcomes. [Hogarth, 1987: 132] Memory can be 
classified as short-term and long-term. Short-term memory is our memory for 
information that has just been received and on which operations are still being 
performed. Short-term memory is the active part of our memory and has limited 
capacity. 
Long-term memory is the repository of our knowledge. It can be accessed as 
needed to recall information received very recently, or over a long period into the 
past. Hogarth [1987: 134] reports that most theorists agree that long-term memory 
works by recalling fragments of information that allow the individual to 
reconstruct more complete representations of the information. These fragments 
of information are linked in a network of associations, and these associations 
trigger the recall and reconstruction. People construct their own 'codes' for 
remembering information of importance to them. 
Thus memory may work in a way which enables accurate recall and 
reconstruction of the person's perception of past events and communications, or 
it may work to provide a distorted recollection. Given that the person's 
perception is subject to various heuristics and biases, the information stored may 
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itself be accurate or distorted. Thus the information recalled may be accurate, or 
of varied degrees of inaccuracy. 
Further, memory can shape perception. Memory provides a person with 
anticipated patterns of expectations about incoming information [or the 
information for which to search], and this can interfere with what is perceived. 
ACTIVITY: 
List all of the metaphors for memory you can think of. Which do 
you think is most appropriate? 
Some examples are: 
• photographs taken with a camera and kept in a photo album; 
• a filing cabinet; 
• the random access memory [RAM] of a computer; 
• periodic dripping of hot oil onto a jelly so that patterns of 
varying shapes and depth form; 
• a hologram. 
The hologram is possibly the best model of memory. But a hologram is more 
perfect than any person's memory. The hologram provides a three dimensional 
image which can be seen from different perspectives. If a hologram is shattered, 
each piece will contain an image of the whole picture, but from limited 
perspectives. The more pieces reassembled, the more complete becomes the 
image. Similarly with human memory: the images we store are shaped by the 
senses used in perceiving them, and the way in which incoming information is 
framed. 
Memory is also affected by recency and repetition, anticipation and hindsight. 
The recency effect is something like use of a computer with back up files. We 
tend to keep the most recent information in files on the hard disc of the 
computer, transferring older files to backup disks and other storage systems. 
Recall then also requires triggering a memory of the filing system as well as the 
informatio~. Repetition has the ability to ingrain messages more deeply. If hot 
oil is dripped onto the same spot of a jelly on numerous occaisions, the resultant 
pattern is deeper. 
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Prior to and during events we anticipate what the event may be .like, based on 
similar previous experience, or on what others .may have told us. When recalling 
the event from memory we may also recall the anticipations, so that we 
remember the anticipated event rather than the actual event. Information 
received after the event can also shape the memory of that event. In part, this 
post-event information may be encoded in questions causing the recall from 
memory. Hogarth [1987: 142] compares challenging questions- 'did you see the 
broken headlight' with neutral questions- 'did yo see a broken headlight'. The 
former suggests that there was a broken headlight and asks the witness to 
remember seeing it. The latter leaves doubt about the existence of a broken 
headlight, and is less likely to influence the witnesses memory. 
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Chapter 10 Risk Preference 
Aims of this module: 
• to understand 'risk' and the effect of 'framing' on attitude to risk; 
• to apppreciate the importance of business ethics; 
• to be aware of the major conceptions of ethical principles; 
Decision makers are frequently forced to grasp for certainty in an uncertain world. 
Our uncertainty can be about the state of the world, the response, the effect of that 
response, or any combination of the three. Whatever the cause of uncertainty, 
there will be risk associated with the choice between alternative responses- a 
decision. An individual's attitude to risk, or risk preference, will influence the 
decision made. 
"Risky choices, such as whether or not to take an umbrella and whether or 
not to go to war, are made without advance knowledge of their 
consequences." [Kahneman & Tversky, 1984: 341] 
Some people place value judgements on risk-seeking behaviour: 'to succeed you 
must take risks', or 'you are foolish to take so many risks'. 
Attitude to risk was considered to be a consistent personality trait until 
Kahneman and Tversky provided statistically significant evidence that 
individuals can be risk averse, or risk taking depending on the circumstances. 
Economic analysis [utility theory] has been based on the assumption of risk 
aversion, building on the work of Daniel Bernoulli published in 1738. Bernoulli 
showed that people are generally averse to risk, and that risk aversion decreases 
with increasing wealth. [Kahneman & Tversky, 1984: 342] The flaw in this work 
appears to be that it examines risk preference only with regard to ultimate states of 
wealth. In fact, peop1e normally think of outcomes in terms of gains, losses, and 
neutral outcomes, without regard for the size of the final outcome. Kahneman & 
Tversky [1984: 342] suggested that "subjective value is a concave function of the 
size of a gain" and convex for losses. The function is significantly steeper for 
losses than for gains. [Figure 10.1] Individuals are risk averse in the domain of 
gains, and risk seeking in the the domain of losses. Kahneman & Tversky [1984: 
342] cite their own research and that of others published in 1979 and the early 
1980s as evidence for this argument. 
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Figure 10.1 
A hypothetical value function 
LOSSES 
$,persons 
-10 
Prospect theory 
VALUE UNITS 
+100 
-50 
-100 
+ 0 
GAINS 
$,persons 
The hypothetical person in Figure 10.1 is shown as attaching subjective value of 
+50 for a gain of 10 [dollars, jobs, lives, quality, etc], and subjective value of -88 for 
an equal loss. The attractiveness of the possible gain is not nearly enough to offset 
the aversiveness of the possible loss. 
This relationship between subjective values is the basis of prospect theory: 
"the way in which the problem is 'framed', or presented, can dramatically 
change the perceived neutral point of the question." [Bazerman, 1994: 57] 
Economic decision theory - expected-value theory - incorporates two basic 
principles: 
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• dominance - if prospect A is at .least as good as prospect B in all 
respects and better in one, then A will be preferred to B. [And if B 
is preferred to C, A will be preferred to C.] 
• invariance - the preference order between prospects does not 
depend on the way in which they are described. [If A is preferred 
to B, -(-A) is preferred to -(-B).] 
1.0 
Decision 
weight: .5 
w(p) 
0 
Figure 10.2 
A hypothetical weighting function 
.5 
Stated probability: p 
Risky prospects can be characterised by their possible outcomes and by the 
probability of these outcomes. Decision theory applies probabilies directly. That 
is, a 50% chance of winning is exactly that: a 50% chance of winning [Plous, 1993: 
98], a 10% chance is a 10% chance. Prospect theory asserts that decision weights 
overweight low probabilities and underweight medium and high probabilities. 
[Plous, 1993: 98] [Figure 10.2] Plous [1993: 99] refers to an example of Russian 
roulette: the difference between 0 and 1 bullets is valued more highly than the 
difference between 3 and 4 bullets. Kahneman & Tversky [1984:344-346] 
demonstrated that reducing the probability of a loss from whatever it is [say .6] to 
half that [.3] is less valuable than reducing it from that [.3] to zero. The reduction 
in probability is exactly equal, and decision theory would apply the changes 
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directly. Prospect theory clariefies our understanding of why the reduction from 
.6 to .3 has less subjective value than the reduction from .3 to 0. 
Framing effects 
The same option can be framed in different ways, leading to failure of the 
invarience principle. [Kahneman & Tversky, 1984: 343] For example, a survey to 
decide whether or not to upgrade the quality of the campus cafeteria could include 
questions framed positively, negatively or nuetraly: 
• positive- Do you think the cafeteria is always clean; 
• negative- Is the cafeteria usually untidy and dirty; 
• neutral - How clean is the cafeteria. 
Levin, et al [1985] found also that decision makers treat missing information 
subjectively, depending on how the problem is framed. 
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Chapter 11 Schemata 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to understand the nature and role of schema. 
" ... problem definition is relative, there being no basis for preferring one 
definition over another." [Smith, 1989: 966] 
" ... schemata are simplified models of the relationships between variables 
relevant to a strategic problem." [Schwenk, 1988: 49] 
Any problem may be defined in various ways. This is more than just the framing 
effect affecting an individual's risk preference. In fact, if problem identification is 
not done with care, a decision maker may solve the wrong problem. [Smith, 1989: 
966] Both Smith and Schwenk draw attention to the important role of individual 
cognitive processes in problem identification. 
Smith [1989: 968-971] identifies four dimensions of problem definition: 
• conceptualization of what definition involves - perspective, 
knowledge specification, gap specification, etc; 
• substantive alternatives within a conceptualization; 
• scope of the problem construct- the amount of complexity that 
can appropriately be incorporated in a problem, and the various 
levels at which it can be defined; 
• linguistic variations on a substantive alternative - the choice of 
words used to describe the problem content. 
He suggests a four stage framework comprising recognition, development, 
exploration, and redefinition. These are all cognitive processes and may be done 
differently by individuals. 
Schwenk [1988] goes further, claiming problem identification is also preceded by 
some special mechanisms: assumptions, frames of reference or schemata, 
cognitive maps, simplification processes, and analogies from other problems. 
Attempts by strategists to understand complex problems may be based on biases in 
81 
their strategic assumptions (Schwenk, 1988). Strategic assumptions then, form 
the basis for frames of reference or schemata through which decision 
Figure 11.1 
The process of problem identification 
[Based on Schwenk, 1988] 
Individual cognition 
simplification process 
Simplification 
Cognitive Maps Processes 
• Concepts about Individual Hypothesis 
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makers represent complex strategic problems. Further, analogy and metaphor 
may be the means by which cognitive maps and schemata from other problem 
domains are applied to new strategic problems. Figure 11.1 illustrates how 
problem identification is preceded by this complex set of determinants. As a 
problem can only be identified if it is understood, the role of cognitive 
simplification processes (which influence assumptions and schemata), analogy 
and metaphor, cognitive maps, and schemata are all critical. 
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l ·. 
Schemata is organised knowledge derived from personality, experience and 
vicarious learning. In making decisions, manq.gers apply scripts drawn from the 
frame of reference, or schemata. A script is a highly specialised type of schemata 
that retains knowledge of actions appropriate for specific situations and context . 
It is obvious that the manager's script plays an important part in determining 
how he or she arrives at a decision. The manager's script development can also 
be strongly influenced by his immediate environment. When there is a strong 
organisational ideology, or culture [Schein, 1985], a strong corporate internal 
decision system [French, 1979], and powerful significant others within the 
organisation, then these factors also shape the development of scripts used by a 
manager [Figure 11.2]. This influence may occur through the analogies and 
metaphors developed from past and parallel experience, or operate directly on the 
development of scripts within 
Figure 11.2 
Script development 
'
•• Org· aniSation .•... , J I fudividual ~-~··_. --~·--·~·-·-··~;~--~----------~·----------~ 
the frame of reference or schemata. Figure 11.2 shows that the influence from the 
organisation to the individual is stronger than that of the individual on the 
organisation. It also shows the feedback loops to individual cognition, to the 
organisation, and to significant others both within and outside the organisation. 
Scripts provide a framework for understanding information and events, and 
serve as a guide to appropriate behaviour to deal with certain situations and as 
linkages between cognition and action. [Figure 12.1] The shaded area in Figure 
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12.1represents the individual cognitive simplification process shown in Figure 
11.1. The effect of the organisation on individual script formation is also depicted. 
The rest of the diagram shows how scripts operate through intervening variables 
on the various stages of the decision process. Comparison between Figure 12.1 
and Figure 5.1 [Module 2 above] will show how individual cognition feeds into 
the total decision process. This comparison offers some insight into the 'black 
box' of Figure 8.1. It is important to realize that this black box is unique for every 
individual. 
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Chapter 12 Decision Styles 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to be aware that there are many decision styles; 
• to understand your own decision style, and be able to compare it 
with others. 
Differences exist between the ways in which individuals make decisions, and the 
ways individuals make decisions at different times, and under different 
circumstances. Several researchers have offered typologies of style. Two are 
presented here, one relatively simple classification, and a second offering sixteen 
decision styles. 
Rowe and Mason [1987] apply a questionnaire to establish individual 
characteristics on two vectors. The individual may have a right brain orientation 
or left brain orientation, and may have an action or ideas orientation. An 
individual can have both a left brain and a right brain orientation, and both an 
ideas and an action orientation. The results provide four cells in a matrix labelled 
analytical, conceptual, directive, and behavioural [Figure 12.2] The subject is 
scored for these four decision styles, and for each of the orientations. Rowe and 
Mason [1987: 51] then aggregate scores to derive 256 possible patterns of combined 
scores. Mean scores for three decision styles: senior executive, staff, and middle 
management are shown in Figure 12.2. Each individual can be described as fitting 
each type according to how their scores compare with the means shown in Figure 
12.2. 
Nutt [1989: 106-132] offers an alternative typology based on Jungian psychology. 
As we noted earler Jung believed that, in middle age, people undergo a major 
transition from youthful impulsiveness and extroversion to thoughtfulness and 
introversion. Nutt claims that each person has 
·• a preferred mode of gathering information; 
• a preferred mode of processing information; 
• a preferred type of action; 
• a dominant focus when taking action. 
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These preferences and focus join together to provide a preferred decision style. 
Figure 12.1 
Relationship between cognitive simplification processes, 
script development, and the decision making process 
[Based on Schwenk 1984 and 1988] 
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Orientation 
left brain 
right brain 
idea orientation 
Figure 12.2 
A decision styles matrix 
[Rowe & Mason, 1987: 44] 
Analytical Conceptual 
Directive Behavioural 
left brain right brain 
Pattern of scores 
ideas 
action 
mean Decision style mean Combined score mean 
165 analytical 90 executive [c+d] 155 
135 directive 75 staff [a+b] 145 
170 conceptual 80 middle 
action orientation 130 behavioural 55 
management 
[a+b+d] 220 
Choice styles 
According to Jungian theory [Nutt, 1989: 111] people are born with preferences for 
sensation or intuition [S or'N], and for thinking or feeling [Tor F]. [Figure 12.3] 
These preferences influence education, work and other experiences. 
Sensing and intuition represent quite different approaches to gathering 
information. The operational rule for a sensate is that possibilities must be 
backed-up by facts. For intuitives, facts without context can be misleading. 
Sensing uses a coding device to search for deviations from accepted standards, and 
enable extraction of significant details from copious information. Intuition seeks 
patterns in a comprehensive picture or situation. 
Thinkers stress generalisations and believe that decisions should be amoral and 
impersonal. Feelers tend to be heuristic and can reach a flash of insight. 
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Thinking [T] 
Preferred 
mode of 
processing 
information 
Feeling [F] 
Implementation styles 
Figure 12.3 
Choice Styles 
[Nutt, 1989: Figure 6.1, page 113] 
Prefered mode of gathering information 
Sensation [S] Intuition [N] 
Systematic [ST] Speculative [NT] 
Information: quantitative Information: future 
measures possibilities 
Warrant: statistical Warrant: assumptional 
significance or axiomatic flux and stochastic 
logic parameters 
Decision aids: cost-benefit Decision aids: decision 
analysis and evaluation trees with sensitivity 
research analysis 
Judicial [SF] Heuristic [NF] 
Information: current Information: current 
situation od circumstances possibilities 
Warrant: acceptance and Warrant: experience and 
compromise by judgement 
interested parties 
Decision aids: decision Decision aids: mutual 
groups adjustment 
Nutt's preferred action types are based in Jungian psychology and are shaped by 
the way individual's prefer to deal with the world. An individual's dominant 
action focus is cognitive, not behavioural. Internals [I] focus on concepts and 
ideas; externals [E] prefer to deal with people and things. [Figure 12.4] Judges U] are 
action oriented, and find it difficult to search for hidden clues. They are good at 
summing up the evidence. Perceivers [P] are passive and insightful. They prefer 
to set up experiences, rather than 'tell how'. 
Individual implementation styles can be observed by others, and provoke 
reactions in those observers. [Figure 12.5] For example a persuader observing 
another persuader in action will critique his or her quality of arguement; while a 
broker would say he or she acts without means. An influencer would describe a 
persuader as naive, and a pesuader would say an influencer is devious. 
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Sixteen decision making styles can be identified by combining the choice and 
implementation styles. Nutt [1989: Appendix C, pages 569-574] provides a 32 
question survey form for self-analysis, and in Chapter 7 explains the 
characteristics of each style. The different styles may have positive, neutral or 
negative relationships when exposed to each other in group situations. Nutt also 
suggests that some styles also have 'shadow styles' which may be adopted if 
necessary. 
Internal [I] 
Dominant 
focus when 
taking action 
External [E] 
Figure 12.4 
Implementation styles 
[Nutt, 1989: Figure 6.2, page 125] 
Prefered type of action 
Judging [J] Perceiving [P] 
Influencers [IJ] Tuners [IP] 
Data: ability to Data: hidden meanings 
manuever 
Warrant: end justifies Warrant: mutual 
means understanding 
Techniques: incentives Techniques: game 
and rewards, behavioural scenario 
modification 
Persuaders [EJ] Brokers [EP] 
Data: merits of a case Data: organisational 
Warrant: understanding pressure points 
imperatives to act Warrant: evoke sanctioning 
Techniques: persuasion mechanism 
and personal power Techniques: negotiation 
and bargaining, cooptation 
As noted above, there are other methods for analysing decision styles. Nutt's 
model is attractive because it is soundly based in psychoanalitic theory, and 
provides clearly defined categories. It also helps us to understand why it is that 
some people dominate group decision outcomes: their natural styles are more 
forceful than others. Some individuals do not have strong preferences for 
appreciation of information, or for action. [Nutt, 1989: 151-152] These people are 
able to use auxiliary styles, and may exhibit flexibility in decision making. People 
with strong preferences are likely to use only their dominant styles, and will have 
shadow styles among the remaining 15 styles. Individuals who have a strong 
internal orientation, and prefer perception to judgement must adopt another style 
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to make their wishes known and to achieve equal influence. Their behaviour is 
misleading and their preferred decision style remains hidden. [Nutt, 1989: 152-153] 
Acting 
style 
Influencer 
[IJ] 
Persuader 
[EJ] 
Broker 
[EP] 
Tuner 
[IP] 
Figure 12.5 
Reactions to implementation styles 
[Nutt, 1989: Table 6.1, page ] 
Reactions provoked in: 
IJ EJ EP 
Lost 
Devious Violates 
opportunities rules of 
to manage the conduct 
situation 
Critique Acts Naive quality of without 
arguement means 
Limited by Acts Exploits 
focus on without bargaining 
means rationale leverage 
Limited by Prone to Reflects when 
what others inaction means must be 
want cultured 
IP 
Takes 
unnecessary 
risks 
Insensitive to 
necessity of 
compromise 
Unable to 
learn 
Values and 
feelings 
revealed 
Similarities and differences in decision styles can contribute to understanding the 
probability of cooperation and conflict occuring between people in work 
situations. [Nutt, 189: 153-159] Coalitions of 'like-minded' people may occur 
because of compatible decision styles, with conflict occurring because of 
incompatible styles. However other factors may hide the influence of decision 
style. The potential for agreement in approaches to decision making is 
summarized in Nutt [1989: Figure 7.1, page 155] 
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Chapter 13 
Making 
Aims of this Chapter: 
Morality • 1n Decision 
• to understand 'risk' and the effect of 'framing' on attitude to risk; 
• to apppreciate the importance of business ethics; 
• to be aware of the major conceptions of ethical principles. 
"Untill about ten years ago we knew so little about the topic of 
organizational ethics that a book like this probably couldn't have been 
written ....... But, in recent years, researchers have begun to rigorously study 
business ethics. Although there's much left to learn, we're begining to 
understand the factors that influence ethical decisions in organizations." 
[Trevino & Nelson, 1995: 4] 
Morality in organisational decision making is an issue for both individual 
managers, and for, and of, the organisation as a whole. The ethics of business 
management has a distinctly different set of conceptual problems from those of 
other professions. 
The essential problem with business ethics is that management as a profession 
has no normative purpose. A manager's morality is mediated by the complex set 
of interactions within the organisation in which he or she works. Other 
professions havea clear path of applied ethics. This path begins with the general 
values and norms of society, moves to the normative purpose of the profession, 
then to the values of the practitioner, and is ultimately expressed in professional 
practics. Because managers work in a vast array of organisations, each having 
institution-specific values to carry out its own responsibility, the context for each 
manager's values can vary from organisation to organisation. The path to a 
manager's ethics may lead to different standards for ethical practice depending on 
the type of, and specific organisation in which a manager is employed. [Powers & 
Vogel, 1980] Later in this Module we refer to this as the corporate internal 
decision system· [ CID]. 
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Ethics is essentially about human behaviour. [Trevino & Nelson, 1995: 13] But an 
individual's behaviour is strongly influenced by the norms and standards set by 
the structural and cultural standards of the context in which he or she operates. 
The behaviour, including moral behaviour, of a manager in a business 
organisation is strongly shaped by the norms and practices of that organisation. 
Moral • reasontng 
The moral behaviour of an individual is influenced by the contextual situation, 
and is also determined by the person's psychological development- there are 
individual differences in ethical standards and moral behaviour. It seems 
important, therefore, that in judging the moral behaviour of others we should 
attempt to understand the principles underlying that behaviour. Reaching a 
conclusion is a logical process of establishing and evaluating premises. In matters 
ethical, the process requires understanding of ethical principles or standards and 
evaluation of the facts to derive an ethical judgement: 
Moral standards + Factual information = Moral judgement 
Stages of moral development 
Judging the behavior of others requires understanding of their moral standards as 
well as our own. The best explanation of the individual aspects of moral 
behaviour is Kohlberg's model of the stages of moral development. [Trevino & 
Nelson, 1995: 88] At a superficial level this model has basic similarities with 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Both have their origins in phenomenological 
psychology. 
Kohlberg [1969, 1983] advanced a view of human beings making decisions at six 
stages, within three levels of human moral development. Most adults and most 
businesses appear to operate or, in the case of businesses, be operated] within the 
second level. However, there are examples of business decision making at all 
levels of cognitive moral development (CMD). The four components of 
Kohlberg's model are: 
• moral judgement has a cognitive base; 
• moral stages represent qualitative differences in modes of 
thinking; 
• individuals develop through an invariant sequences of stages [the 
solid arrows in Figure 13.1]; 
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• individuals prefer problem solution at the- highest stage available 
to them. [Trevino, 1992] 
The stages of Kohlberg's model are summarised in Figure 13.1. There are two 
stages within each of three levels, with the second stage being a more advanced 
and organised form of the level's general perspective. The stages are considered 
to be structured wholes in the sense that an individual's moral reasoning is 
expected to form a coherent system that can best be described by one stage or by a 
combination of at most two adjacent stages. The stages are hierarchical 
integrations in that people comprehend reasoning at all stages below their own 
[the shaded lines in Figure 13.1]. 
The basic structural element in moral development is social perspective - the 
view one has of his or her relationship to society and its moral rules and 
expectations. 
Preconventionallevel 
At the preconventional level individuals adopt reward-seeking, punishment-
avoiding behaviour. Rules are viewed as being imposed and external. At stage 
1.2 there may be reciprocity with others where this is instrumental to self-interest. 
Conventional level 
At the conventional level the individual has internalised the shared moral 
norms of society, or some segment of it such as a peer group. Conformity to the 
prevailing social order, and living up to what is expected by relevant others are 
characteristic of this level. At stage 2.1 interpersonal trust and social approval are 
important. At stage 2.2 fulfilling agreed duties is important. 
Postconventionallevel 
At the postconventional, or autonomous level, the individual has moved beyond 
identification with others' expectations, and laws. At stage 3.1 the individual 
accepts moral principles, not because society says they are right, but because he or 
she knows what it means to say they are right and understands what makes them 
right. Very few people, if any, reach stage 3.2 where the individual believes right 
action is defined in universal principles, and is able to both act in accordance with 
these principles (even when they conflict with law) and to defend them. 
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Kohlberg' s model provides a starting point for furthering our understanding of 
managers' moral development (Maclagan, 1992). It offers a definition of moral 
development in which the focus is on moral autonomy, versus conformity, and 
this is consistent with contemporary organization and management development 
thinking. There is explicit recognition that action based on moral principles 
requires emotional commitment to the values as well as cognitive development 
or understanding (Maclagan, 1992). 
Organisational morality 
Corporations can be recognised as moral persons [Douglass, 1986; French, 1979], 
and their organizational cultures include moral reasoning as embodied in 
Kohlberg's model. Whilst there are many examples of corporations setting a floor 
for the moral behaviour of individual managers [moral codes, culture], there is 
also evidence, as in the CSR case [McKenna, 1995] and the Pinto case [Gioia, 1995], 
that the corporation places a ceiling on the moral development of individual 
managers. That is, both the corporate internal decision system [CID] and the 
culture of an organization operate to limit the cognitive development of 
employees. For most companies this limit is probably at one or other of the two 
stages in Kohlberg's Level2 [Figure 13.1]. 
Figure 13.1 
Stages of cognitive moral development 
LEVEL 3 AUTONOMOUS STAGES a"'''"'"""~'~"'' 
/ 3.2 Universal ethical principles 
/ 3.1 Social contract orientation 
LEVEL 2 CONVENTIONAL STAGES _,.;a;;;,-,~!f&>~~"'tr"'-'W'•~·; 
/ 
2.2 Law and order orientation 
2.1 Interpersonal concordance orientation 
LEVEL 1 PRECONVENTIONAL STAGES ~-~i~:::;;;BliJili:!~""l 
., 1.2 Instrument and relativity orientatio 
/ 1.1 Punishment and obedience orientation 
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Jackall suggests that 
"Bureaucracy transforms all moral issues into immediate practical concerns. 
A moral judgement based on a professional ethic makes little sense in a 
world where the etiquette of authority relationships and the necessity for 
protecting and covering for one's boss, one's network, and oneself supersede 
all other considerations and where non accountability for action is the norm. 
As a matter of survival, corporate managers ... simply do not see most 
issues that confront them as moral concerns even when problems might be 
posed in moral terms by others." Uackall1988: 111 
Where the bureaucracy is well established and internal promotion is the norm, 
the ceiling [or floor] placed on the moral development of managers becomes a 
ceiling [or floor] for the organization itself. 
Corporate internal decision systems 
According to French (1979), for a corporation to be treated as a responsible agent 
requires that some events are describable in a way that makes certain sentences 
true, sentences that say some of the things a corporation does were intended by 
the corporation itself. That is not accomplished if attributing intentions to 
corporations is only a shorthand for attributing intentions to the biological 
persons who comprise, for example, its board of directors. If that were the case 
then, on metaphysical if not logical grounds, there would be no way to 
distinguish between corporations and mobs. A corporation's internal decision 
(CID) structure is the requisite redescription device that licenses the predication of 
corporate intentionality. The two elements of interest in aCID structure are 
• an organizational or responsibility flow chart that delineates 
stations and levels within the corporate structure, and 
• corporate decision recognition rules embedded in corporate policy. 
The primary function of a CID structure is to draw experience from various levels 
of the corporation in a decision making and ratification process. When operative 
and properly activated the CID structure accomplishes a subordination and 
synthesis of the intentions and acts of various biological persons into a corporate 
decision. The melding of disparate interests and purposes gives rise to a corporate 
long-range perspective that is distinct from the interests and purposes of the 
aggregate of individuals who either inaugurated the corporation, or subsequently 
comprise its board of directors and various levels of management. The actions 
and behaviour of an individual manager are evaluated by the CID structure and 
organizational culture, as well as by the individual and his/her significant others. 
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Douglas [1986, p 67] says that even the simple acts of classifying and remembering 
are institutionalised. 
Value congruence 
There may be congruence or contention between the moral values of an 
organisation's culture, and those of individual decision makers acting for that 
organization [Leidtka, 1989]. The culture of an organization is the 
"basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an 
organization, that operate unconsciously, and that define in a basic "taken-
for-granted" fashion an organisation's view of itself and its environment." 
[Schein, 1985: 6] 
Scott & Hart [1979: 62] draw attention to the organizational imperative, which 
requires individual obedience to the organization, and such obedience is a value 
in and of itself, supplanting the presumed ascendancy of the individual. 
According to Douglas [1986: 112] an organization provides the categories of 
thought, sets the terms of self-knowledge, and fixes identities for its members. 
Corporations have reasons because they have interest in doing those things that 
are likely to result in realisation of their established corporate goals regardless of 
the transient self-interest of directors, managers, etc. Corporate goals and desires 
are probably more stable than those of human beings, and not very wide ranging 
[French, 1979]. 
Leidtka [1989] suggests that both individual and organizational values may be 
consonant or contending, and that there may or may not be congruence between 
individual and organizational values. The model is predictive of how a manager 
may behave in five typical situations. [Figure 13.2] In Quadrants I and III, the 
position of the organization is clear and unambiguous in the eyes of the manager. 
The manager in Quadrant I perceives internal role conflict between [eg.] caring for 
others, and the need to minimise costs. In Quadrant III, the manager has no 
internal conflict, but may find that his/her values [A] coincide with the 
organisation's, or [B] conflict with them. In Quadrants II and IV, the manager 
perceives mixed messages emanating from the organizational culture. If the 
manager has internal value conflict he or she will be swayed be his or her peers. 
If he or she has consonant values, the individual will fight for his or her ideals, 
and in this situation political behaviour is nurtured. 
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Figure 13.2 
Individual and organisational value congruence and conflict 
[Adapted from Leidtka, 1989: Fig. 1] 
Individual Organizational values 
values 
Consonant Contending 
QUADRANT I QUADRANT II 
COMPLIANCE WITH GROUPTHINK 
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES 
Contending Individual disequilibrium: Individual disequilibrium: 
Organizational position Organizational value 
perceived as clear and conflict. 
unambiguous. 
QUADRANT III QUADRANT IV 
Individual equilibrium: POLmCAL BEHAVIOUR IS 
A. INDnnDUAL:ORGANIZATIONAL NURTURED. 
CONSONANCE. Individual equilibrium: 
Consonant Organizational values are internalized, 
there is no conflict. Organizational value 
·········••··••·············•·••••••••············· 
B. INDIVIDUAL:ORGANIZATIONAL conflict. 
CONFLICT. 
Exit and voice mechanism operates. 
Combining the Kohlberg cognitive moral development model with Leidtka's 
value congruence model increases the predictive power of the latter. Individuals 
at lower CMD levels will have a tendency to internal value conflict; those at the 
autonomous level, stage 5, are more likely to have value congruence. The values 
of an individual manager can differ from those of other managers, and from the 
values of the organizational culture. Where there is a strong culture, individual 
managers will receive consistent signals regarding acceptable behaviour. These 
signals form a significant part of the behavioural evaluation, and affect the 
feedback through the modifiers shown in Figure 13.3, and are embodied in the 
CID structure. 
There is nothing in the Leidtka model which suggests that the organizational 
culture will be of a higher or lower moral standard than the values of the 
individual. Thus conflict may arise when the individual manager's behaviour is 
judged to be immoral in terms of the organizational culture, or when the 
organizational culture sets a lower moral standard than that of the individual 
manager, or when the values emphasised by the organization differ from those 
held by a manager. In all cases there are further sources of conflict in how the 
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manager's behaviour is judged in terms of the values and norms of society, 
including the individual's significant others. 
As we noted in the section on Schema above, individuals operating within an 
organization will develop schema to minimise the cognitive effort required in 
decision making. A schema is derived from prior experience and vicarious 
learning that results in the formation of "organised" knowledge- knowledge that, 
once formed, precludes the necessity for further active cognition. A script is a 
specialised type of schema that retains knowledge of actions appropriate for 
specific situations and contexts. 
Both CID systems and congruence in organizational culture provide fertile 
ground for the development of managers' scripts and schema. Where the 
organizational imperative is a significant value in the organizational culture and 
the CID system is well defined, particular 
Figure 13.3 
An integrated model of ethical decision making 
by an individual in an organisation 
Social and economic environment 
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Consequences 
• congruence I conflict 
in values 
'Beh~Vioural 
· evaltiation 
Figure 13.4 
A multisystem cultural framework for developing 
and changing organisational ethics 
[Trevino & Nelson, 1995: Figure 1, page 218] 
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Leadership 
Structure 
Rules/policies 
Reward system 
Informal 
systems 
Norms 
Heroes 
Rituals 
Myths/stories 
Orientation/training Language 
Decision processes 
,, ,, 
Ethical/unethical 
behaviour 
scripts will be imposed on individuals. Behavioural evaluation feedback through 
the various modifiers [Figure 13.3] will reinforce these scripts. This may be a 
desirable characteristic in an "excellent" company in which moral development 
has reached Kohlberg's Level3, but in others it can both contribute to 
continuation of behaviour which is immoral, and prevent managers from 
including new ethically relevant data in decision making. 
If the corporate culture and CID structure are based in traditional economic and 
management theories these scripts will exclude ethical considerations: decision 
makers will be amoral. Improved ethical behaviour of business organizations 
requires both script development and script revision for individual decision 
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makers, and more complex changes in the organizational culture and CID system. 
Trevino & Nelson [1995: 214-219] offer an approach to changing organisational 
ethics. It requires change in organisational culture and will take a long time-
they suggest six to fifteen years. Their approach would fit the radical humanism 
cell in the Burrell & Morgan matrix. [Figure 1.5 above] 
Human beings are essentially good and open to change, and prefer association 
with a just and caring organisation that supports ethical behaviour and punishes 
unethical behaviour. In this type of environment most individuals will choose 
moral behaviour. 
Unethical behaviour should be punished, and should be a trigger to review the 
values of the organisation as expressed in both the formal and informal systems. 
This review would include an audit of the components of both systems. [Figure 
13.4] The data gathered should be discussed with all employees, enlisting them 
into the change process. 
Consider the paradox: 
9s it ethical to manage organisational ethics? 
Whose values are to prevail? how do we know if they are worth emulating? 
[Trevino & Nelson, 1995: 219] 
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Module 5 
Chapter 14 
Aims of this Chapter: 
Group decision 
making 
Power and Politics 
• to understand the concept of power; 
• to understand the concept of politics; 
• to be able to discuss the political process; 
• to be aware of the types of political games played in organisations. 
Introduction 
Allison [1971], Schwenk [1984, 1989] and others have identified three generic 
perspectives, or explanatory models, of strategic changes in organisations 
[decisions]. Allison defines these decisions as 
• the product of conscious choice [Unitary Rational Actor], 
• the product of organisational processes [Organizational Processes], 
and 
• the product of political bargaining and compromise Bureaucratic 
Politics]. [Schwenk, 1989: 178] 
We have not addressed these approaches directly in this Study Guide, but the first 
two are implicitly covered in Modules 1 and 2. The sociologists' paradigms 
[Module 1] .and the psychology pardigms [Module 4] provide a basis for 
understanding the third - political- approach. Whenever groups are involved in 
decision making there is scope for political behaviour. Politics will occur 
whenever one or more of the individuals has access to power and the skill and 
will to use it. 
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Three concepts are vitally impotant in understanding decision making by groups: 
power, politics, and groupthink. Their importance increases as the number of 
people increases. 
"[T]he more people there are who work on a problem, are affected by it, and 
know about it, the more complex and lengthy the decision process is likely to 
be." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 64] 
McCall & Kaplan qualify this generalisation: it depends on where the power 
resides. If power to decide and to implement is held by one individual, then the 
decision can be made and implemented without much overt opposition. [McCall 
& Kaplan, 1990: 65] The Bradford Studies process model [Module 2] draws 
attention to the significance of power I politics in the decision making process by 
highlighting the effect of political cleavage. 
Power 
"Power is not happiness." [William Godwin] 
"The world is governed by very different personages from what is 
imagined by those who are not behind the scenes." [Benjamin Disraeli] 
""But organizations, particularly large ones, are like governments in that 
they are fundamentally political entities." Ueffrey Pfeffer, 1992] 
"Power is an aphrodisiac - one that works on men, women, and ourselves. 
Our intellects and our hearts shut down, cease functioning, when we are 
drunk on power. We think of ourselves as invincible. Power and wisdom 
are mutually exclusive. One cancels the other out completely." Uonathon 
Lazear] 
"What is of interest in the study of power is who gets it, when, how, and 
why, not what it is." [Henry Mintzberg, 1983] 
Most current management texts [eg Bartot et al, 1995: 448-450] introduce 
discussion of leadership with a preliminary discussion of the sources and use of 
power by managers in their leadership role. They define power as the capacity to 
affect other's behaviour, and recognize six types of power: 
• Legitimate power relates to the status of a position rather than to a 
person. Subordinates accept directions from the person because of 
the position held. 
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• Reward power relates to a manager's ability to exercise control 
over an array of rewards which may be distributed to others. 
• Coercive power depends on the ability to punish others. Forms of 
punishment include criticism, negative performance appraisal, 
demotion, and termination. 
• Expert power derives from knowledge, technical skills and 
experience. 
• Information power derives from a manager's greater access to 
important information, and the discretion over how it is 
dis semina ted. 
• Referent power derives from the admiration, friendship and 
loyalty of others. 
Subordinates can react with commitment, compliance, or resistance: 
• Expert and referent power tend to cause commitment; 
• legitimate, information and reward power tend to lead to 
compliance; 
• coercive power has a strong tendency to provoke resistance. 
This view of the place of power in leadership is based on assumptions of people's 
powerlessness, lack of vision, and inability to master the forces of change. The 
view may be appropriate in societies and organisations where most people have 
little or no education, limited access to modern media communications, and, in 
the case of coercive power, low ambition based on acceptance of a class structure. 
The view of leadership developed in learning organisation theory is different. In 
a learning organisation, leaders are designer, stewards, and teachers- they are 
responsible for learning within their organisations. [Senge, 1990/1992: 340] This 
learning is tantamount to the sharing and creation of increased power. 
Authority versus politics 
Compatable with learning organisation theory is the view that the best way to 
increase power is to share it. [Kanter, 1979: 359-361] Kanter argues that power 
derives from the organisation and the individual. The 'organisational' sources of 
power lie in the access to 
• lines of supply - influence outward, over the environment, 
enables managers to bring in the things that their own domain 
needs: resources to distribute as rewards, and prestige; 
• lines of information - knowledge from both formal and informal 
sources; 
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• lines of support - job parameters that allow for discretion and 
judgement, and the backing of other important figures in the 
organisation. 
Individual power sources are systemic, deriving from 
• job activities - the use of the discretion, recognition and 
relevance built into job parameters; 
• political alliances with sponsors, peer networks, and subordinates. 
According to Pfeffer [1981: 311-315] power is a structural phenomenon, created by 
organisational departmentalisation. It may be either formal or informal. Formal 
power - authority, is that which is vested in an office of the formal organisation. 
It is legitimate. Informal power- politics, is illegitimate and is sanctioned neither 
by formal authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise. It may exploit all of 
these. Informal power may be positive or. negative in its impact on the 
organisation, and through time may be legitimized as authority. Increased 
sharing of formal power reduces the need to resort to illegitimate power or 
politics. 
Powerlessness 
The problem facing organisations today is powerlessness [the lack of productive 
power], not that too many people execise too much power. [Bennis & Nanus, 
1985, cited in Pfeffer, 1992: 32] Powerlessness is expressed through the use of 
oppressive power: holding others back and punishing them in whatever ways are 
available. 
Each individual's power can be increased by sharing what power he or she has 
with subordinates. Opening up the lines of supply, information and support 
enables those subordinates to accomplish more, increasing the performance of the 
organisation as a whole and increasing the supply of organisational power 
sources. [Kanter, 1979: 361] 
It has been suggested that managers choose between decision criteria on the basis 
of two underlying logics of justification - strategic and tactical. [Bacharach, et al, 
1995: 483] This choice is partially governed by their power within the 
organisation.· Strategic criteria- to do with the long term goals of the 
organisation - are more likely to be adopted by powerful managers. Tactical 
criteria - to do with one's own survival in the organisation in the short term -
are most likely to be adopted by powerless managers. 
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The power held by an individual decision maker, or by that person's 
organisational unit, is a factor in individual decision making. It also contributes 
to the individuals decisional behaviour in group situations. 
Politics 
"Organisational politics involves those activities taken within organisations 
to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one's 
preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus 
about choices." [Pfeffer, 1981: 313] 
"[P]ower is what matters." [Mintzberg, 1983: 22] 
In fairness to Mintzberg, we must add that he does recognize that much more is 
involved, but this is the perspective of the 1983 book. 
The power of an individual in or over an organisation rests in a gap in its own 
power system- some dependency or uncertainty over which the individual is 
able to exercise influence. Mintzberg [1983: 24] identifies five bases of power: 
• control of a resource; 
• control of a technical skill; 
• control of a body of knowledge; 
• a legal prerogative, or exclusive rights or privilege to impose 
choices; 
• access to those who can rely on the above. 
It is clear that these power bases may be internal or external to the organisation, 
and this effects the nature of organisational politics. 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois [1988: 742] argue that despite popular belief conflict is not 
the source of politics. Nor is the decentralisation of power. From a study of eight 
firms they formulated seven propositions linking the origins, organisation and 
effects of politics. [Figure 14.1] Their propositions are: 
1 .. The greater the centralization of power in a chief executive, the 
greater the use of politics within a top management team. 
2. Conflict is not a sufficient condition for the use of politics. Rather 
conflict leads to politics only when power is centralized. 
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3. The greater the use of politics in a top management team, the 
greater the likelihood of stable alliance patterns. 
4. When the use of politics is high, the basis of alliance is likely to be 
similarity of demographic attributes. 
5. Demographic similarity is not a sufficient condition for stable 
coalition formation. Rather, demographic similarity leads to 
stable alliance patterns only when power is centralized and the 
use of politics is high. 
6. The formation of stable alliance patterns lags changes in the use of 
politics. 
7. The greater the use of politics within the top management 
team,the poorer the performance of a team. [Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988: 742-764] 
In addition to these propositions, the model shows that the level of politics has a 
direct positive influence on both information restriction and time consumption. 
Both detract from performance. Politically active firms exhibit slow growth and 
low profitability. Finally, there are negative feedbacks to power centralisation and 
conflict. 
The model supports Pfeffer's claim that "once politics are introduced into a 
situation, it is very difficult to restore rationality." Pfeffer, 1981: 333] 
"[T]he Law of Political Entropy: given the opportunity, an organization will 
seek and maintain a political character." [Pfeffer, 1981: 331] 
Mintzberg [1989: 214] says that political activity can be found in every human 
system. However, its exercise requires skill and will as well as a power base. 
[Mintzberg, 1983: 25] The skill is in knowing how and when to use one's 
resources, information and technical skills, and being able to influence others 
with sensetivity and to organise the necessary alliances. Influencers on 
organisational decisions exercise their influence through means and systems of 
influence. There are both internal and external influencers- actors, or a cast of 
players. [Mintzberg, 1983: 26] The eleven groups of players are: 
The external coalition 
Owners Some may have conceived the idea of founding the organisation and 
served as brokers to bring the initial influencers together. 
Associates The suppliers of inputs, the clients, and trading partners and 
competitors. Only those who engage in non-ecoomic contacts are included. 
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Organisation 
of 
politics 
Effects 
of politics 
Figure 14.~ 
The politics of strategic decision making 
[Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988: Figure 1, 766] 
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** Refers to propositions involving a time lag. 
Conflict 
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Employee associations While they represent people internal to the 
organisation they are external influencers. They exist because of the impotence 
of individual employees as internal influencers. 
Publics Groups representing special or general interest groups: families, opinion 
leaders, conservation movements, local interest groups, government in all its 
forms. 
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Directors The representatives of groups within the external coalition, but also 
including internal influencers. It is at the interface of the external and internal 
coalitions, but as it meets intermittently is treated as part of the external 
coalition. 
The internal coalition 
Chief executive officer 
Operators The workers who produce the products and services, or who provide 
direct support. 
Line managers 
Analysts of the technostructure Those staff specialists concerned with the design 
and operation of the systems for planning and formal control. 
Support staff The staff specialists who provide indirect support to the operators 
and line managers. 
Ideology The set of beliefs shared by the internal influencers that distinguishes 
the organisation from others. 
Mintzberg [1983] recognises three basic types of external coalition: dominated, 
divided and passive, depending on the number of external influencers. [Figure 
14.2] He also identifies five internal coalition types: bureaucratic, personalized, 
ideological, professional and politicized. There are fifteen possible combinations 
between the 
external and internal coalitions. Six of these are described as natural 
relationships. The other nine are less common and less stable. [Figures 5.3 and 
5.4] A dominated external coalition will lead to a bureaucratic internal coalition. 
Five of the internal coalition types tend to move the external coalition towards a 
divided coalition. The divided and politicized coalition are mutually supportive. 
[Figure 14.3] 
The six power configurations can be described in terms of the stars, the play, and 
the venue. [Figure 14.5] Mintzberg uses the theatre as a metaphore describing the 
plays as: 
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Figure 14.2 
Three basic types of external coalition 
[Mintzberg, 1983: Figure 7.1] 
Divided Passive 
Figure 14.3 
Natural relationships between the types of 
external and internal coalitions 
[Mintzberg, 1983: Figure 17.1] 
EXTERNAL 
COALITION 
Dominated 
Passive 
Divided 
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INTERNAL 
COALITION 
Professional 
Politicised 
The Instrument 
The Closed System 
The Autocracy 
A command performance in two acts; 
A private showing in one act 
A solo performance; 
The Missionary 
The Meritocracy 
The Political Arena 
A passion play; 
A talent show in many acts; 
A circus with many rings 
Figure 14.4 
The configurations of organisational politics 
[Mintzberg, 1983] 
EXTERNAL 
COALITION 
Dominated 
Passive 
Passive 
Passive 
Passive 
Divided 
Dominated 
Dominated 
Dominated 
Dominated 
Passive 
Divided 
Divided 
Divided 
Divided 
INTERNAL 
COALITION 
Bureaucratic 
Bureaucratic 
Personalized 
Ideological 
Professional 
Politicized 
Personalized 
Jdealogical 
Professional 
Politicized 
Politicized 
Bureaucratic 
Personalized 
ldealogical 
Professional 
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POWER 
CONFIGURATION 
The Instrument 
The Closed System 
The Autocracy 
The Missionary 
The Meritocracy 
The Political Arena 
Probably less common 
and Jess stable, likely 
r.- to be Political Arena 
[sometimes in form of 
functional hybrid or 
way-station in transition]. 
1-" 
1-" 
1-" 
Configuration 
Instrument 
Closed System 
Autocracy 
Missionary 
Meritocracy 
Political Arena 
Stars 
One, or a group of 
dominant external 
influencErs. 
The system itself. 
The chief executive 
officer. 
The organisation's 
ideology. 
The experts of the 
operating core and 
support staff. 
All the influencers. 
Figure 14.5 
The theatres of organisational politics 
[Mintzberg 1983: Chapters 18-23] 
Play Venue 
The external influencer imposes its will on the Stable environments, with simple, mass output 
internal coalition through formal constraints and technologies; typically subsidiaries of other 
direct controls. A bureaucracy emerges and puts its organisations, public sector departments. 
surpluses-at the disposal of the dominant external 
influencer(s ). 
Power resides in the internal coalition; the insiders Stable environments; large, mature organisations 
are motivated by utilitarian rather than ideological with dispersed external influencers; typically 
values; the organisation seeks increasing control of widely held companies, volunteer organisations, 
its environment; bureaucratic control emerges, and unions, some public service bureaucracies, large 
power flows to those with formal authority. government itself. 
The CEO is the only centre of power; the ideology Small organisations in simple, dynamic niches. 
reflects his or her beliefs, external influencers are 
_passive, expertise is discouraged. 
The ideology preempts the systems of authority, Social activist groups, charitable organisations 
expertise and politics; a high degree of participation determined to change some aspect of society. 
with a simple [bureaucratic] structure; avoidance of 
external influencers. 
Internal coalition dominated by experts who gain Complex environments or technical systems force 
power on the basis of skill and knowledge; authority organisation to rely on expertise; professional 
is weak; organisational ideology is weak, but bureaucracies -hospitals, universities, accounting 
professional ideology is strong; a good deal of firms; adhocracies - project teams. 
politics; formal goals displaced by personal _goals. 
The organisation is an arena dominated by politics; Anywhere where the existing order is challenged 
conflict may arise in the external coalition [divided] because of a change in the fundamental condition. 
or internal[ divided]; unable to pursue any goal with Confrontation - intense, brief and confined conflict; 
consistency. complete Political Arena - intense, brief and 
pervasive conflict; sltaky alliance - continuing, 
confined conflict; politicised organisation -
pervades all power relationships. All forms can be 
functional if they bring about desirable change. 
I 
' 
I 
I 
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Political Games 
An organisation functions on the basis of a number of systems of influence: 
authority, ideology, expertise, or politics. [Mintzberg, 1989: 216] The first three are 
regarded as legitimate. Politics is technically illegitimate, or alegitimate- it is not 
formally authorised, widely accepted, or officially certified. Political activity can be 
described as games. The games are intricate and subtle, overlapping, and 
governed by rules. [Mintzberg, 1989: 216] Mintzberg identifies thirteen games. 
Insurgency Ususlly to resist authority, or even to effect change. Usually played 
by lower participants. 
Counterinsurgency Played by those with legitimate power who fight back with 
political means. 
Sponsorship Using superiors to build a power base, professing loyalty in return 
for power. 
Alliance-building Played among peers who negotiate implicit contracts of 
support for each other to advance themselves. 
Empire-building Played by line managers individually with subordinates. 
Budgeting Played overtly with defined rules to build a power base. 
Expertise Nonsanctioned use of expertise by flaunting it or feigning it. 
Lording Using legitimate power in illegitimate ways. 
Line versus staff Each side tends to exploit legitimate power in illegitimate ways. 
Rival camps Played when alliance or empire-building games result in two major 
power blocks, giving rise to a two-person, zero-sum game. 
Strategic candidates Individuals or groups seek to promote their own favoured 
changes of a strategic nature by playing political games. 
Whistle-blowing Privileged information used by an insider to 'blow the whistle' 
to an influential outsider on some questionable or illegal behaviour. 
Young turks A small group of 'young Turks', close to but not at the centre of 
power tries to throw legitimate power into question, to reorient the basic 
strategy, displace its expertise or ideology. 
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Chapter 15 Group Decisions 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to appreciate the effects of groups on the decision process in 
organisational settings; 
• to understand the social-psychology of group decision making; 
• to be able to identify groupthink; 
• to know how to structure group decision processes to minimize the 
groupthink factor. 
In Module 1 [Figure 2.4] we examined the sociologists definition of behaviour in 
work groups as an open system in which there is interdependence between 
activities, interactions and sentiments. The material covered in Module 4, and 
the early part of this module makes clear that the behaviour of decision making 
groups in particular, is far more complex. As well as self interest and motives, the 
individual brings a 'world view', prior experience, and political skill and will into 
the arena. Figure 15.1 offers a more complete view of the influences on any group 
decision. Each individual is seen as bridging the boundary between the 
organisation and its environment, with four aspects to that bridge- the 
economic, the social, the political, and the individual persona. Thus each 
individual brings a plurality of influences from both the organisational system 
and its broader environment into the decision group. This group is also directly 
influenced by the organisation. 
"Deep within Western culture lies a wish to see human behaviour-
individual as well as collective- as something controlled by a consistent 
goal-oriented rationality." [Abaek, 1995: 86] 
Regrettably [?],the reality is very different. Individual differences in personality, 
interests, experience and values, and, especially, political behaviour enter into the 
scripts which comprise the decision making equation. Recall the Burrell & 
Morgan paradigms model and the definitions of rationality offered in Module 1. 
These help us to understand how each person can describe and explain a decision 
situation in very different terms. 
The reality is that the profile of a group has direct bearing on its effectiveness in 
making a decision. Important aspects of the profile and the implications are 
summarised in Figure 15.2. These can be related to the decision making process 
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discussed in Module 2. The first two have most effect in the recognition, 
diagnosis, search/screen, and design phases of Figure 14.1. The others are most 
influential in the later stages. 
Theory laden data 
In group situations the problem of attaching meaning [Module 2] is at least as 
significant as it is for the individual decision maker. Mitroff & Emshoff [1979] 
identified the importance of theory-laden data and the role of committed 
proponents. They argue that the data which decision makers apply to strategic, or 
wicked, decisions is value laden. That is, it is structured as a script based on the 
individual's frame of reference. [Schwenk, 1988; see Figures 4.8 to 4.11 above] 
Figure 15.1 
Social psychology of group decision making 
SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION 
SYSTEM 
AND 
STRUCTURE 
PSYCHOLOGY 
OF 
·:·:·.-:·:·.-:·:·.-:...... pER SON PSYCHOLOGY ::·::·:·::.-:·: . .-: 
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In group decision situations this leads to polaris12d viewpoints and ego 
investments. [Figure 15.3] If an alternative [theory-laden] viewpoint is not 
developed, action will be based on the viewpoint of the committed proponent. 
Sometimes, opponents of this viewpoint will develop a strategy based on their 
theory-laden interpretation of the original data and additional [theory-laden] data. 
This sub-group will present 'hit-or-miss' counter arguments in which they also 
have significant ego investment. Synthesis of the competing strategies [theories] 
is impossible, and a stalemate will exist until either crisis forces action by the 
stronger party, or attention is refocussed onto other issues. 
Figure 15.2 
Influence of the group profile on decision making 
Aspects of 
group decision making 
• theory-laden data 
• framing effects 
• deindividuation 
• polarization 
• groupthink 
. 
. 
.... 
-.. . 
Implications for: 
• decision definition 
• member selection 
• decision making 
process 
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Impact on 
effectiveness 
of groups 
Action 
taken 
Figure 15.3 
The role of theory-laden data in decision making 
[Based on Mitro££ & Emshoff, 1979] 
Theory-laden data 
Committed proponent 
of viewpoint 
Selective use 
of data 
Polarised 
viewpoint 
Ego 
investments 
Action by 
brute force 
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Synthesis of 
positions 
impossible 
Opponent 
of viewpoint 
Re-interpretation 
of data 
Hit-or-miss 
counter arguments 
Disquiet 
diminishes 
Attention to 
other issues 
Mitro££ & Emshoff [1979] argue that the problem of theory-laden data and ego-
investment could be overcome through a structured approach by the decision 
making group to assumption specification and strategy creation. [Figure 15.4] 
Thise would require, as a first phase in the decision making, a clarrification of the 
assumptions underlying the data on which original strategies are based. The 
second, dialectic phase, involves assumption negotiation, re-selection of data, and 
formulation of counter strategies. From this strategy pool it is then possible to 
review all of the data and underlying assumptions to develop a set of acceptable 
assumptions. This set of assumptions would then be applied to the appropriate 
data to difine a "best" strategy. Clearly, this process must include both making 
transparant the various schemata of the individuals involved, and overt [rather 
than covert] politics. 
r---
-
~ 
Figure 15.4 
Four basic steps of methodology 
Mitro££ & Emshoff, 1979: Figure 1] 
I. ASSUMPTION SPECIFICATION 
Original 
.....,. Data .....,. Assumptions Strategies 
IT. DIALECTIC PHASE ~, 
Counter 
... 
Assumption 
1111111111 Data Strategies, Negotiation 
ffi. ASSUMPTION INTEGRATION PHASE 
Strategy 
... Data 
~ Assumption 
Pool Pool 
IV. COMPOSITE STRATEGY CREATION ~ , 
"Best" Acceptable 
Strategy _. Data .alii Assumptions 
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Framing effects 
As we saw in Module 4, strategic options can be framed in different ways. When 
groups are involved in decision making this framing can bring about the 
polarised viewpoints, ego investments and unsatisfactory outcomes we have just 
discussed. In other circumstances framing effects can be a central feature of the 
groupthink phenomenon which will be discussed later in this module. 
Deindividuation 
The phenomenon of deindividuation was probably first identified by LeBon 
[1879]. [Diener, 1989: 209]. LeBon was interested in why individuals in crowds act 
in ways that are uncharacteristic of them. Fromm [1941] was concerned with the 
motives that lead some persons to submerge their individuality in groups. 
[Diener, 1989: 209] Subsequent theory has built on these bases. Diener [1989: 210] 
defines a deindividuated person as 
"prevented by situational factors present in a group from becoming self-
aware. Deindividuated persons are blocked from awareness of themselves as 
separate individuals and from monitoring their own behaviour." [Diener, 
1979: 210] 
Diener sees deindividuation as one end of a continuum with complete self 
awareness at the other end. Several factors occur together within groups to bring 
about dindividuation: physical activity, an outward focus of attention, and the 
conception of the group as a whole. When there is a lull in activity, the 
deindividuated person is likely to attend to the group rather than focus attention 
back on the self. The larger the group, and the more culturally and physically 
similar its members, in which one is immersed, the less-self aware one becomes. 
In Diener's [1979: 228] theory, self-awareness is absent from many everyday 
behaviours. However, the individual normally switches to self-awareness and 
self-regulation when confronted by the initiating conditions. The person's self-
regulatory behaviours can be blocked when he or she is immersed in 
deindividuating circumstances. [Figure 15.5] 
Deindividuated individuals contribute to poor decision making by groups in a 
way parallel to that explained by group polarization theory. However, the two 
theories offer fundamentally different explanations. 
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Figure 15.5. 
Self-awareness and self-regulation versus deindividuation 
[Diener, 1980: Figure 7.1, 227] 
I Many or most everyday activities 
[not self-aware and not self-regulating] 
A. Habitual behavioural sequences 
B. Scripted behaviours 
C. Well-learned reactions to stimuli 
D. Outward focus of attention 
E. Well-planned sequences 
!:-.·--',~:. 
411-----------........ -~<~~-!;: 
,-----------~------------ --------------------------~ 
II Self-awareness and self-
regulation initiated by: 
A. Novel situations 
B. Evaluation by others 
C. Behaviour produces 
unexpected outcome 
D. Self-focusing stimuli 
E. Behaviour clearly related to 
one's morals or standards 
III Self-awareness and 
self-regulation 
A. Self-monitoring 
B. Retrival of personal and 
social standards and 
comparison of own 
behaviour to standards 
C. Self-reinforcement 
D. Planning and foresight 
E. Behaviour often inhibited 
by fear of punishment 
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IV Deindividuation caused by 
[self-awareness and individual 
self-conception blocked] 
A. Perceptual immersion 
in the group 
B. Outcome attribution immersion 
C. Action and other factors using up 
conscious processing capacity 
D. Outward focus of attention 
E. Conceiving the group as a 
united whole 
F. Relegating decision making 
to the group 
V Self-regulatory capacities lost 
when deindividuated 
A. Can't easily monitor own 
behaviour or perceive 
products of own action 
B. Social and personal standards 
can't be retreived and can't compare 
own behaviour to standards 
C. Can't generate effective 
self-reinforcement 
D. Can't use planning and foresight 
E. Lack of inhibition regarding future 
punishment 
F. More reactive to immediate cues, 
emotions, and motivations 
Group polarization 
"The average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme in the same 
direction as the average of the pregroup responses." [Myers & Lamm, 1976: 
603] 
Whyte [1989: 45] defines group polarization as the tendency for discussion to 
enhance the point of view originally dominant within the group. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that group decisions are moderate or prudent in 
character : an average of individual viewpoints. The group polarization research 
refutes this. Two causes are identified [Isenberg, 1986; Myers & Lamm, 1976; 
Whyte, 1989]: 
• social motivation - group members alter their views in a manner 
calculated to maintain an image of social desirability [see Module 
1]; 
• informational influence - the preponderance of arguments and 
facts adduced during discussion tend to be supportive of the 
dominant position and will therefore reinforce it [see Theory-
laden data above]. 
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Chapter 16 Groupthink 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to be able to identify groupthink; 
• to know how to structure group decision processes to minimize the 
groupthink factor. 
Irving Janis [1972: 9] coined the term groupthink to apply to 
"a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action ... a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgement that 
results from in-group pressures." [cited in Neck & Moorhead, 1995: 537] 
"If, as part of your job you meet regularly in groups, then you are potentially 
affected by groupthink on an ongoing basis ... groupthink, not unlike heart 
disease, is a silent disease, doing its devastation in quiet, subdued day-to-day 
routine." [Timmons, 1991: 2] 
The original groupthink model has been subjected to considerable partial analysis, 
and modified several times to include additional explanatory variables. [Neck & 
Moorhead, 1995] Janis suggested that a set of antecedent conditions leads to a 
concurrence-seeking tendency within the group, The shared cohesiveness is 
expressed in eight symptoms of groupthink, and the effect can be seen in seven 
symptoms of defective decision making. [Janis, 1972] Subsequnt research has both 
placed some doubt on the validity of the research - some groups making both 
effective and defective decisions, and introduced new variables which increase 
the explanatory power of the model. 
The most recent expanded model [Neck & Moorhead, 1995] is shown in Figure 
16.1. 
The original antecedent conditions were cohesiveness, insulation, lack of 
methodological procedures for search and appraisal, directive leadership, and 
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high stress. Neck & Moorhead have redefined some of these, added to and 
categorized them, and introduced two sets of moderating variables [factors which 
may change the relationship between the antecedent conditions and the 
symptoms]. They also identify three subsets of symptoms. [Figure 16.1] The 
symptoms and moderators are: 
Symptoms of groupthink 
Type 1 Overestimation of group 
1 Illusion of invulnerability; 
2 Belief in inherent morality of the group - allows the group to 
disregard any objections to its behaviour. 
Type 2 Closed-mindedness 
1 Collective rationalizations - through a pooling of group 
resources and downplaying of drqwbacks of a chosen course; 
2 Stereotypes of out-groups - the enemy, and a strong we versus 
them feeling toward an adversary group; 
Type 3 Pressures towards uniformity 
1 Self-censorship under the guise of group loyalty or team spirit; 
2 Illusion of unanimity; 
3 Direct pressure on dissenters; 
4 Self-appointed mindguards - preventing data, facts, and 
opinions from reaching the group. 
Moderating conditions 
Closed leadership style behaviours 
The leader does not encourage member participation, does not state his or her 
opinions at the begining of the meeting, does not encourage divergent 
opinions from all group members, and does not emphasize the importance of 
reaching a wise decision. 
Methodical decision making procedures 
1 Parliamentary procedures; 
2 Alternative examination procedures; 
3 Information search procedure. 
Janis' original model did not specify which antecedent conditions led to which 
symptoms of groupthink. Neck & Moorhead [1995: 548] argue that 
• Type A antecedent conditions may lead to Type 3 symptoms; 
• Type B1 antecedent conditions lead to Type 3 symptoms; 
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• Type B2 antecedent conditions niay lead to Type 1 and Type 2 
symptoms; 
• Type B2 antecedent conditions may lead to Type 3 symptoms. 
However, the moderating variables will have effect on the causal relationships. 
Neck & Moorhead's [1995: 553-554] propositions are: 
1. Groups that evidence high degrees of Type A, Type B1, and Type 
B2 antecedent conditions will not exhibit Type 3 symptoms of 
groupthink in the presence of an open-style leader and/ or when 
the group utilizes methodical decision making procedures. They 
will exhibit Type 3 symptoms in the presence of a closed 
leadership style and/ or when the group does not use methodical 
decision making procedures. 
2. Groups that evidence Type B2 antecedent conditions will not 
exhibit Type 1 and Type 2 symptoms of groupthink in the 
presence of an open-style leader and/ or when the group utilizes 
methodical decision making procedures. 
3. Groups that evidence Type B2 antecedent conditions will exhibit 
Type 1 and Type 2 symptoms of groupthink in the presence of a 
closed leadership style and/ or when the group does not use 
methodical decision making procedures. 
Avoiding Groupthink 
In earlier parts of this Study Guide we have consistently noted that each person 
can describe and explain a decision situation in very different terms. An intuitive 
view, therefore, is that involving a group of people in decision making would 
lead to a more rational, balanced decision. In Module 1 you were asked to study a 
number of decision debacles '[Nutt, 1989] which showed how easy it is for groups 
to make wrong decisions. In fact, many decision fiascoes have followed group 
decision making. 
Whilst Janis [1972] was concerned only with a set of antecedent conditions and a 
concurrence-seeking tendency of groups, others have contributed supporting 
theories which can be included in an augmented concept of groupthink. In the 
preceding section we noted the Neck & Moorhead [1995] reformulation of the 
Janis model. Earlier, we also discussed other contributions: 
• Mitroff & Emshoff [1979] identified the importance of theory-laden data and 
the role of committed proponents. 
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Antecedent conditions 
A Decision makers 
cons ti tu te a 
cohesive group 
B-1 Structural faults 
of the organisation: 
1 Insulation of the group; 
2 Lack of tradition of 
impartial leadership; 
3 Lack of norms requiring 
methodical procedures; 
4 Homogeniety of members; 
B-2 Provocative 
situational context 
1 High stress from external 
threats with low hope of 
better solutions than 
the leader's; 
2 Low self esteem; 
3 Highlyconsequential 
decision [important 
for participants]; 
4 Pressure due to 
constraint of time. 
Figure 16.1 
Extended Groupthink Model 
[Neck & Moorhead, 1995: Fig 1, 546] 
Moderating conditions Symptoms of groupthink 
Closed leadership 
style behaviours 
~ ~ 
Methodical decision 
making procedures 
1 Parliamentary procedures; 
Type 3 Pressures 
towards uniformity 
1 Self-censorship under 
the guise of group loyalty l--
or team spirit; 
2 Illusion of unanimity; 
3 Direct pressure on dissenters; 
4 Self-appointed mindguard. 
~ 
Type 1 Overestimation 
of group 
1 Illusion of invulnerability; 
2 Belief in inherent morality 
of the group. 
I--
Type 2 Closed-mindedness 
1 Collective rationalizations; 
2 Stereotypes of out-groups. 
2 Alternative examination procedures; 
3 Information search procedure. 
Symptoms of defective 
decision making 
1 Incomplete survey 
of alternatives; 
2 Incomplete survey 
of objectives; 
3 Failure to examine 
risks of preferred choice; 
4 Failure to reappraise 
initially rejected 
alternatives; 
5 Poor information 
search; 
6 Selective bias in 
processing information 
at hand; 
7 Failure to work out 
contingency plaris. 
• 
Low probability of 
successful outcome 
• Kahneman & Tversky [1984] showed that strategic options can be framed in 
different ways. When groups are involved in decision making this framing 
can bring about polarised viewpoints, ego investments and unsatisfactory 
outcomes. 
• Myers & Lamm [1976] and Whyte [1989] identified group polarization as the 
tendency for discussion to enhance the point of view originally dominant 
within the group. 
• Finally, deindividuated individuals are blocked from awareness of themselves 
as separate individuals and from monitoring their own behaviour. [Diener, 
1979] 
How can poor decisions resulting from the groupthink phenomenon be avoided? 
Neck & Moorhead [1995: 555] suggest groupthink prevention training including 
1 suggestions for when the leader should change his or her style, 
and 
2 establishment of methodical decision making procedures such as 
parliamentary procedures. 
Mitro££ & Emshoff [1979] suggest a structured approach to assumption 
specification and strategy creation. [Figure 15.4] Cosier & Schwenk [1990] advocate 
programmed conflict: 
• the devil' s advocate - a formalised critique of the initial prop sed 
course of action by an individual or sub-group; 
• the dialectic method - programming conflict into decisions by 
structuring a debate between conflicting viws. 
Whyte [1989: 53] cites 
• measures designed to counter defensive avoidance U anis & Mann, 
1977], 
• reducing group insularity Uanis, 1982], 
• reducing directive leadership practices Uanis, 1982], 
• framing a decision problem in a variety of ways in order to 
investigate the stability of the preferences, 
• training of decision makers to evalute decision problems in terms 
of final states or assets, not as gains or losses [Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984] 
Timmons [1991: 5] adds that the leader should encourage free discussion, non-
judgemental attitudes, and acceptance of divergent thinking as opposed to a 
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closed leadership style characterized by tightly-controlled discussion, highly 
defensive posturing, and convergent thinking. Building on Mitroff & Emshoff 
[1979] we can also suggest assigning members the role of critical evaluator to force 
the group to re-evaluate their assumptions and rationalisations. 
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Module 6 Is that all 
there ·is ? • ? • ? • 
Chapter 17 Summing Up 
"An optomistic, but naive, view of this book would expect that its readers 
would immediately improve their decision making. I say naive because it is 
premature to expect the change process intended by this book to be fully 
integrated at this point." [Bazerman, 1994: 206] 
"After 21 chapters of mind-bending problems and counterintuitive results, it 
is time to take a step back and ask what it all means." [Pious, 1993: 253] 
"The process by which decision-making practice changes is basically the same 
process as that which is being changed. Organizations take action on this 
front in fundamentally the same way they take action on any other front- by 
doing whatever it takes." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 123] 
Aims of this Chapter: 
• to review the main thrusts of this course; 
• to encourage you to consciously work towards better decision 
making. 
Introduction 
In setting the framework for this course we paraphrased McCall & Kaplan [1990: 
108]: "decision making in organizations is complex, often amorphous, and seldom 
amenable to simple prescriptions." 
The first three modules took a general approach. Module 1 reviewed the 
significance of decision making for all organisations, and continued with some 
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models of man and the major economic and sociological theories of the firm, and 
concluded with Granovetter's theory of embeddedness. 
You were also asked to think about the concepts of ignorance and rationality, and 
the paradigms with which we view the world. Several definitions were offered -
are you now confident that you understand what decision making is? 
In Module 2 we discussed two approaches to analysis of the organisational 
decision making environment, the difficulty of identifying the issue, and the 
process of decision making. 
Module 3 looked at aspects of the use of models as aids to decision making. An 
important conclusion in this Module is that models developed within any 
particular science are embedded in the concepts of rationality of all other sciences. 
"We cannot hope to find solutions to our problems if we persist in our old ways 
of thinking." [Mitro££ & Linstone, 1993: 171] Some useful, simple models were 
included in this Module; and the process of modelling was described. You were 
also asked to read about Chaos and decision making. Uennings & Wattam, 1994] 
In Module 4 we looked at the most important aspects of the inside of the 'black 
box' which is the individual in the decision process. We started with some 
contentious ideas about the nature of the human mind: are you in charge, or is 
your mind? We then reviewed the major theories of personality, each of which 
offers an approach to what happens inside the 'black box'. A review of the 
theories of perception, cognition, memory and risk preference followed to 
provide a basis for the decision theories of schemata [Schwenk, 1984, 1988; Smith, 
1989] and decision styles [Rowe & Mason, 1987; Nutt, 1989]. Module 4 closed with 
discussion of morality in decision making, and you were asked "is it ethical to 
manage organisational ethics?" 
The focus of Module 5 was on group decision making. The major issues here are 
power and politics, and the groupthink phenomenon with associated theories. 
Mintzberg rightly states that what power is is not of interest; who gets it, when, 
how and why are the interesting questions. [Mintzberg, 1983] Power bases may be 
internal or external to an organisation and this affects the politics. Once politics 
enters the situation it is very difficult to restore rationality. [Pfeffer, 1981: 333] 
Mintzberg [1983] uses the theatre as a metaphore for the political play in different 
contexts. He also defines thirteen political games. [Mintzberg, 1989] 
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The profile of a group has direct bearing ·on its effectiveness in .making a decision. 
Politics is significant, but other theories also contribute to understanding of group 
decision making. Among these are theory-laden data [Mitro££ & Emshoff, 1979], 
polarisation [Myers & Lamm, 1976; Whyte, 1989], deindividuation [Diener, 1989L 
and groupthink. Uanis, 1972, 1982; Neck & Moorhead, 1995] 
Consequences, Implications 
McCall & Kaplan [1990] provides the best available discussion of this aspect of 
decision making. 
"In managerial life, then, there is no rest for the weary. 
Given this complexity, it is no surprise that the consequences of managerial 
action are not always clear victories or defeats." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: 91] 
Research on decision making suffers from a problem of its own which should 
have become clear during your reading of this book 
"Judgement and decision research is conducted by human beings who are 
prone to many of the same biases and errors as their subjects." [Pious, 1993: 
259] 
Researchers who want and expect to see a pht:nomenon are likely to overestimate 
its frequency. [Fischoff, 1991, cited in Plous, 1993: 260] These observations are 
much the same as Hogarth's [1980] findings on information processing biases 
referred to in Module 4. They represent a word of warning for both the student 
and the manager: our obserations of the decision making of others [and 
ourselves] may be inaccurate. 
This does not mean we are confronted by an impossible task. Better 
understanding of this complex and difficult field, and of the available models 
does give you the tools for better decision making, and better ability to interpret 
the decision styles of and decisions made by others. In group situations you may 
be able to 
• apply your political understanding to achieve better decisions 
than would occur if the political games of others were allowed to 
run their course; 
• take actions such as assumptions surfacing, reframing, devils 
advocacy, dialectics, reducing insularity, and encouraging open 
leadership to avoid groupthink. 
129 
" .... and something else they didn't teach you in business 
school ... decision making is a turbulent stream, flowing from 
a murky past to a murkier future." [McCall & Kaplan, 1990: xvii] 
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